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The Role of the Federal Government
in Worker Adjustment Assistance
An Evaluation of the 1974 Trade Act in the
Light of Worker Adjustment Assistance in
Japan
Linda Elliott*
National industrial policies designed to promote the adjustment of national
economies to new economic realities pose the challenge of assisting experienced
industrial workers obtain new skills. In the United States, the role of the federal
government in this process is brought into sharp focus in the criticism of the
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program for displaced workers.'
TAA is shaped by the confluence of two principles of political economy:
standard free market theory and a prescriptive extension of the compensation
theory of welfare economics, referred to in this note as the compensation princi-
ple.2
The command of the market principle regarding adjustment assistance is easy
to summarize: it would limit government involvement as much as possible,
allowing supply and demand to bring about adjustment of workers to job loss
caused by imports. Strictly applied, the free market principle would preclude any
trade adjustment assistance for workers. While it has obviously not held such
* Linda Elliott is a member of the class of 1986, University of Michigan Law School.
I. See Trade Act of 1974, §§ 221-250, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2019-2030 (current
version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2271-2322 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Trade Act]. In this note "TAA"
refers to those portions of the Trade Act of 1974 concerning assistance to workers as well as to the
worker adjustment assistance provisions contained in the predecessor of the Mrade Act, the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, §§ 321-338, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872, 892-99. The Trade Act
contains provisions entitling firms and communities as well as workers to trade adjustment assistance.
See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2374 (1982). TAA is not the only federal program providing assistance to
unemployed experienced workers, but it is the only one with widespread impact. With the exception
of the Disaster Unemployment Assistance Act, the others-the Redwood Employee Protection Pro-
gram, the Railroad Employee Protection Program, the Urban Mass RTansportation Employee Protec-
tion Act, and the Airline Employee Protection Program-target a much more narrowly defined group
of workers than does TAA. For a summary of these programs, as well as TAA, see M. IsHIKAWA,
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND PROLIFERATION OF OTHER INCOME PROTECTION PROGRAMS FOR
EXPERIENCED WORKERS (U.S. Dep't of Labor Employment and r1aining Admin., Unemployment
Insurance Occasional Paper 80-1 (1980)).
2. See C. FRANK, FOREIGN TRADE AND DOMESTIC AID 12 (1977) (supporting only the assertion
regarding the compensation principle).
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sway since the enactment of TAA, the free market principle's influence is visible
in TAA program procedures restricting government involvement in worker re-
training.'
The compensation principle, on the other hand, both mandates and limits
government involvement in the adjustment process. It holds that government
policies of net benefit to society should not be allowed to impose disproportionate
costs on any one segment of the population. Thus, when the government formu-
lates policies to encourage international trade and lower prices for consumers, the
compensation principle justifies government assistance to workers suffering the
effects of decreased sales of American products. 4 It does not justify assistance for
3. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text, and notes 69-73 and accompanying text. Prior to
enactment of TAA the desire to permit labor markets to operate freely dominated discussion of worker
adjustment to job loss due to increased imports. Escape clause relief for workers and firms hurt by
U.S. trade agreements officially became part of U.S. trade policy in 1947. However, it was rarely
used, and, in any case, provided only short-term maintenance of protective tariffs or quotas for the
purpose of allowing an industry to recapture its competitive advantage. It did not compensate workers
for job loss or facilitate their transition into new jobs. See Metzger, Adjustment Assistance, in 1 U.S.
COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 320-23 (1971). Although the idea of an adjustment as-
sistance program was raised with some frequency in the 1940s, see, e.g., Wilcox, Relieffor Victims of
Tariff Cuts, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 884-89 (1950) (discussing various proposals), it failed to gain the
support of a significant number of policy makers.
In 1950, a proposal based on the compensation theory was forwarded in a draft report to the
President on foreign economic policy. However, the published version did not specifically address
how domestic industries might adapt to increased imports. 0. REISCHER, TRADE ADJUSTMENT IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 20 (1961). It has been suggested that this omission was based on the fear that
objections to proposed tariff reductions on the grounds that a related adjustment assistance program
would be difficult to administer, would be as strong as objections to a tariff reduction proposal that did
not provide for compensation. Id. Finally, in 1954, the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy
published an adjustment assistance proposal by the President of the United Steel Workers. The
Commission as a whole, however, did not endorse it. Id. at 22. Between 1954 and 1962, adjustment
assistance bills were regularly proposed in Congress, but no hearings were held on them and the idea
received little attention during the debates over the 'rade Agreement Extension Acts of 1955 and
1958. See Metzger, supra, at 323. The major bills are discussed in 0. REISCHER, supra, at 23.
4. For an early discussion of this prescriptive extension of the compensation theory of welfare
economics in the context of adjustment assistance for workers suffering job loss as a result of
increased international trade, see E. STANLEY, WORLD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 159-72 (1945).
The compensation theory, in its classic, non-prescriptive form, is a test used by welfare economists
to determine whether a policy change should be undertaken: it does not describe how individuals or
groups should be treated following enactment of a policy. See H. VAN DEN DOEL, DEMOCRACY AND
WELFARE ECONOMICS 36-40 (1979); C. PRICE, WELFARE ECONOMICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
1-18 (1977); A. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 1-8 (1943). Before
the development of the compensation theory, welfare economists attempted to measure the potential
community benefits of a policy change by measuring its effect on individuals. This proved unwork-
able. A change that one person finds beneficial, may be viewed with distress by another. Since
individuals can not express welfare changes in absolute terms, it was impossible to measure the
aggregrate effect of a change on community welfare without making judgments about the relative
merits of various distribution patterns. Even if such judgments could be made, economists found it
difficult to quantify information regarding individual welfare so that it could be incorporated into a
model of community welfare. See C. PRICE, supra, at 4-6.
Recognizing these limitations, and hoping to avoid the value judgments implicit in distribution
patterns, Vilfredo Pareto developed the basic premise of 20th century welfare economics: a change
will be deemed an improvement in community welfare only if it results in an improvemenit in at least
one individual's welfare and a decrease in the welfare of none. See id. at 6-7. The problem that Pareto
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all unemployed workers, but only those whose job loss is a direct result of
increased imports. Determining when "import injury" has occurred is the crucial
and often problematic task involved in administering adjustment assistance ac-
cording to the compensation principle.
TAA's severest critics argue for the elimination of the requirements mandated
by one or the other of these two guiding principles. Advocates of greater federal
government involvement in worker adjustment, referred to in this note as "expan-
sionists," would increase the flexibility of national industrial planners. They
would endow the federal government with a greater role in searching out trade-
impacted workers and directing them to new skills and industries. 5
Proponents of the elimination of government-sponsored trade adjustment pro-
grams, including the Reagan Administration, would ignore the compensatory
rationale of the current program. They argue that federal assistance for trade-
impacted workers is unfair, costly, and unnecessary in light of existing state-run
manpower training programs.
6
Given the desire of these critics to eliminate aspects of TAA arising from the
compensation and free market principles, useful insight into federal adjustment
assistance may be gained by examining a worker adjustment system that is not
constrained by either idea. Although many countries have created assistance
programs without reference to the compensation and free market principles,7
Japan's, as an example of a successful model of anticipatory government plan-
ning' operating in a largely "market oriented, private enterprise economic sys-
tem," 9 is particularly relevant for comparison.
Part I of this note examines worker adjustment assistance in the United States.
It traces TAA's evolution from its inception as a means of compensating trade-
displaced workers while minimizing government intervention in the market ad-
justment process, through its amendment to reflect congressional concern over
ignored is that most economic decisions over which there is debate result in both loss and gain.
Changes which benefit some and harm none are usually undertaken without discussion. Thus, his
formula was of little use in evaluating most economic policy questions. See id. at 19.
The original compensation theory was an attempt to overcome this limitation. The classic example
of the theory was described by N. Kaldor in 1939. Looking to the English Corn Laws of the 19th
century, Kaldor argued that while their repeal (which lowered the price of bread) did not improve
welfare in the Paretien sense-it made farmers worse off-it nevertheless could be seen as an
improvement in the welfare of society as a whole because consumers were so much better off that they
could, theoretically, compensate the injured farmers. See Kaldor, Welfare Proposition of Economics
and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 EcON. J. 549-52 (1939). Kaldor and other neo-
Paretiens did not go so far as to urge that consumers should compensate the farmers; they merely used
the ability to compensate as an index of the positive net social benefit of the change. See H. VAN DEN
DOEL, supra, at 37-38.
5. See infra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 99-127 and accompanying text.
7. For convenient summaries of worker adjustment programs used in other countries, see Ir'L
LABOR OFFICE, WORKFORCE REDUCTIONS IN UNDERTAKINGS (E. Yemin ed. 1982) and 1 & 2
COMPTROLLER GEN., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, I.D. No. 78-43, CONSIDERATIONS FOR ADJUST-
MENT AsSISTANCE UNDER THE 1974 TRADE ACT: A SUMMARY OF TECHNIQUES USED IN OTHER
COUNTRIES (1979) [volume 2 hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].
8. GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 75.
9. Patrick & Rosovsky, Japan's Economic Performance: An Overview, in ASIA'S NEW GIANT 43
(H. Patrick & H. Rosovsky eds. 1976).
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the low number of worker certifications, to the criticism of its procedures arising
out of more recent congressional interest in government-sponsored retraining as a
means of attaining worker adjustment. After arguing that current certification and
distribution procedures continue to reflect the original goal of the program-
compensation with minimal intervention in the market-the note examines alter-
natives to TAA proposed by the expansionists and the Reagan Administration.
Part II focuses on the Japanese system of worker adjustment. It describes the
lifetime employment system underlying labor relations in Japan and it examines
government adjustment policies implemented in the wake of the 1973-1974 oil
crisis. It concludes that government assistance encouraging local private-adjust-
ment initiatives, rather than government designed and administered retraining
and placement programs, was responsible for the post-oil crisis adjustment of a
large portion of the Japanese workforce.
Part III analyzes proposed alternatives to TAA in the light of the Japanese
experience. Accepting that modification of the current program is necessary, it
argues that neither the expansionists' nor the current Administration's proposals
will encourage the development of local, privately directed retraining and re-
employment initiatives similar to those driving the continuous adjustment of
many Japanese workers. Acknowledging that different labor-management struc-
tures prevent imitation of Japanese adjustment measures by U.S. companies, part
III suggests that the cooperative labor-management attitude crucial to continuous
adjustment of workers in Japan could be fostered in the United States if Congress
did not attempt to give expression to both the compensation and free market
principles in a single program. Arguing that neither principle can be ignored, the
note suggests that attempts to combine them frustrate the achievement of both
their goals. Thus, it proposes a two-pronged adjustment program, the first prong
of which would be devoted to compensating import-injured workers and the
second to encouraging private on-the-job retraining for all workers.
I. ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Original Goal: Balancing Two Principles
In 1962, President Kennedy articulated the purpose of the first trade adjustment
assistance program (TAA).'0 Equating the "obligation to render assistance to
those who suffer as a result of national trade policy" to the obligation of the
federal government to assist former military personnel, he nevertheless warned
that TAA was not to be "a subsidy program of governmental paternalism."
Rather, it was to afford time for "American initiative, American adaptability, and
American resiliency to assert themselves."" Throughout congressional debate,
10. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, §§ 321-338, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872, 892-99
(repealed by the Trade Act of 1974) [hereinafter cited as TEA]. See supra note 1. A convenient source
for the legislative history of the TEA is HouSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF H.R. 11970 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TEA].
1i. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1962) (Message from the President of the United States Relative to the
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the focus of the program's supporters was on compensation, not retraining. 2
Nowhere in the legislative history of this first program is there any indication that
TAA was designed to provide large-scale government directed labor adjustment.
TAA "benefits [were] intended as a reasonable substitute for [a worker's] pre-
vious job security, until the period of adjustment to new conditions [could] be
completed." The government was to act simply "to minimize the adverse impact
[of increased imports] and facilitate the transition to new areas of production and
service. "13
Program requirements ensured that "American initiative" had a chance to
assert itself. The 1962 Act made a worker petition a prerequisite to government
assistance. 14 Only upon the filing of such a petition was the Tariff Commission to
investigate whether a group of workers had suffered import injury. The Commis-
sion's task was to determine
whether, as a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements, an
article like or directly competitive with an article produced by such workers' firm,
or an appropriate subdivision thereof, [was] being imported into the United States
in such increased quantities as to cause, or threaten to cause, unemployment or
underemployment of a significant number or proportion of the workers of such firm
or subdivision. 15
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TEA, supra note 10,
at 43, 90.
12. This is not to say that debate on the bill contained no reference to retraining, but only that the
emphasis was on the obligation of the federal government to help workers through periods of
unemployment caused by lowered tariffs. See, e.g., 108 CONG. REC. 22,286 (1962) (remarks of
Cong. Gross and Cong. Bymes on the conference report), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
TEA, supra note 10, at 1981; 108 CONG. REC. 19,793 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Kerr on H.R. 11970),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TEA, supra note 10, at 1706; 108 CONG. REc. 19,787 (1962)
(remarks of Sen. Smathers on H.R. 11970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TEA, supra note
10, at 1698; 108 CONG. REC. 19,798 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Long on H.R. 11970), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TEA, supra note 10, at 1714.
The focus on cash benefits rather than retraining was also apparent in the reasoning of those
Congressional representatives who did not support adjustment assistance for workers. Their major
objection to TAA was that it would federalize and standardize state unemployment compensation
systems, see, e.g., 108 CONG. REC. 19,792 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Curtis on H.R. 11970), reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TEA, supra note 10, at 1704; 108 CONG. REC. 22,286-87 (1962)
(remarks of Cong. Collier and Cong. Byrnes on the conference report), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF TEA, supra note 10, at 7981-83, and that it was unfair and would cause resentment
among workers who, unemployed for non-import-related reasons, would receive only state unem-
ployment compensation payments. See, e.g., 108 CONG. REC. 22,179 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Bush
on the conference report), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TEA, supra note 10, at 2022; 108
CONG. REC. 22,287 (1962) (remarks of Cong. Byrnes on the conference report), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TEA, supra note 10, at 1983; 108 CONG. REC. 22,291 (1962) (remarks of
Cong. Cahill on H.R. 11970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TEA, supra note 10, at 1990;
108 CONG. REC. 19,792 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Curtis on H.R. 11970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF TEA, supra note 10, at 1701-02; 108 CONG. REC. 19,792 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Curtis
and Sen. Williams), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TEA, supra note 10, at 1704; 108 CONG.
REC. 19,795-96 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Byrd) reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TEA, supra
note 10, at 1710.
13. 108 CONG. REC. 19,793-94 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Williams on H.R. 11970), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TEA, supra note 10, at 1707.
14. TEA, supra note 10, at § 332(a).
15. Id. at § 301(b).
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The Commission generally interpreted this language to mean that the alleged
increase in imports must have occurred nearly simultaneously with trade conces-
sions and that increased imports must have been more responsible for job loss
than all other factors combined. 6 Furthermore, it required the Commission to
find that the job loss of the petitioning workers was a result of trade concessions
made in 1952, the last year in which major trade legislation was enacted. 7
This strict interpretation of import injury almost completely shielded market
forces of adjustment from government intervention. Between 1962 and 1969 not a
single worker qualified for assistance. 8 Not until the Kennedy Round of tariff
negotiations took effect in 1968 was the Commission able to identify the requisite
connection between imports and job loss.19 Even then, however, the number of
workers certified was relatively low. Between 1969 and 1974, the Tariff Commis-
sion provided assistance only to an estimated 47,000 workers in 29 states.20
Motivated largely by the low number of certifications, Congress in 1974
streamlined the petitioning process and eased the program's definition of import
injury to allow for a more attenuated connection between federal trade policies
and job loss. 2 The general character of the changes was compensatory. Although
the Act improved the employment services available to workers, congressional
concern focused largely on providing workers with more adequate cash allow-
ances and on expediting benefit delivery procedures.22
B. The Growing Concern With Retraining
In the year and a half following enactment of the 1974 Trade Act, 178,363
workers were certified for assistance, 23 over three times as many as had been
certified in the entire 12-year history of TAA prior to amendment.2 4 As more
workers were certified for assistance, Congress listened with growing interest to
arguments that TAA should more directly promote retraining.
16. Rosenblatt, Trade Adjustment Program: Crossroads or Dead End? 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1065, 1069 (1977).
17. C. FRANK, supra note 2, at 41.
18. S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1298].
19. See C. FRANK, supra note 2, at 47.
20. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 18, at 131.
21. Trade Act, supra note I, at § 222, 19 U.S.C. § 2272. As a result of these amendments, the
government no longer had to find that trade concessions were the direct cause of the injurious increase
in imports. Instead, a finding that a significant number of workers at a firm had lost their jobs, that the
firm's sales had decreased, that imports of goods directly competitive with those produced by the firm
had increased, and that the increase "contributed importantly" to the loss of jobs, was considered
prima facia evidence of the connection between trade policy and job loss. Id. The law also redefined
"contributed importantly" to mean "a cause which is important but not necessarily more important
than any other cause." Id. For a discussion of the problems involved in the application of these
requirements, see infra notes 39-62 and accompanying text.
22. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 18, at 131.
23. Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, Dep't of Labor, TAA Activity 1975-1984 (unpublished
chart composed from internal reports of the Employment and Training Administration and monthly
reports of State Employment Security Agencies) [hereinafter cited as TAA Activity].
24. Id. Since 1976 certification levels have fluctuated between a low of 16,910 in 1982 and a high of
670,735 in 1980. Id.
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In 1977, the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee
solicited the opinions of labor and business leaders regarding "possible changes
in [the 1974 Trade Act] and the regulations to improve the effectiveness of [its
assistance] programs in achieving orderly adjustment to import injury. "25 One of
the major criticisms of the program was the lack of federal involvement in
retraining. 26 It was suggested that because it left the burden of retraining to state
employment offices, TAA "concentrated on maintaining the status quo, rather
than becoming the outward looking and dynamic program" which Congress
intended it to be.
2 7
The Office of Program Evaluation of the Department of Labor also criticized
TAA in 1977. It noted that the provision of training to TAA recipients had been
"spotty and problematical throughout the country, with uncertainty and confu-
sion in the [state] agencies regarding its desirability, feasibility, and appropri-
ateness for trade affected applicants." 28 It reported that some state employment
offices disliked being forced to administer the training promises of TAA when
they had been told that they were to function largely as job exchanges.2 9 The staff
report of the trade subcommittee contained similar evidence of program failure.
It found that many state offices were unwilling to differentiate between import-
injured workers and other unemployed persons.30
Members of the trade subcommittee agreed that TAA should give greater
emphasise to retraining. The committee staff report stated that "[tihe basic
purpose of a program of benefits to trade-impacted workers, separate from pro-
grams for workers laid off for non-trade-related reasons, is to assist their adjust-
ment to reemployment in the same or a different industry, as opposed to
providing compensation for unemployment."'"
25. Trade Adjustment Assistance Programs Under Title II of the Trade Act of 1974: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. I
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Title 11 Hearings] (opening statement by Cong. Gibbons).
26. See Title I1 Hearings, supra note 25, at 175 (statement of Samuel M. Rosenblatt, Senior
Economic Consultant, International Economic Policy Association); see also Title II Hearings, supra
note 25, at 41 (statement of John Oshinsky, Legislative Representative, United Steelworkers of
America); Title 11 Hearings, supra note 25, at 118 (statement of Governor Thomson of New
Hampshire); Title II Hearings, supra note 25, at 124 (statement of Mark Richardson, President,
American Footwear Industries Association); Title ! Hearings, supra note 25, at 137-40 (statement of
Leonard Woodcock, President, United Auto Workers). Witnesses and legislators also severely criti-
cized time limitations on worker petitions for assistance as well as the lack of information about
certification procedures. See, e.g., Title II Hearings, supra note 25, at 4-10 (statement of Cong.
Sharp); Title II Hearings, supra note 25, at 36 (statement of John Oshinski, Legislative Represen-
tative, United Steelworkers of America); Title H Hearings, supra note 25, at 53-54 (statement of
Cong. Vanik).
27. Title 11 Hearings, supra note 25, at 170 (statement of Samual M. Rosenblatt, Senior Economic
Consultant, International Economic Policy Association).
28. OFFICE OF PROGRAM EVALUATION, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR,
EVALUATION STUDY OF TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR WORKERS UNDER THE TRADE ACT
OF 1974, at 61 (1977).
29. Id.
30. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 95T CONG.,
2D SESS., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON THE TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS UNDER
TrILE II OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, at 24 (Comm. Print 1977).
31. Id. at 14.
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Despite the new congressional interest in adjustment as opposed to compensa-
tion, none of the bills under consideration at the time of the hearings would have
changed TAA procedures to promote greater federal involvement in retraining.32
Yet the performance of the Ohio Employment Office after the steel manufactur-
ing shutdowns in the late 1970s glaringly demonstrated the continued ineffec-
tiveness of administering retraining programs through state offices. 33 In 1980,
President Carter acknowledged that new methods of retraining were necessary for
communities suffering massive layoffs.34 The report of the study group on which
the President's conclusion was based emphasized the need for federal coordina-
tion of adjustment efforts, implying that state administration was inadequate.35
Finally, in 1981, federal interest in retraining found legislative expression in
TAA amendments that effectively, if not explicitly, limited cash benefits to those
workers enrolled in retraining programs, thus ensuring more retraining for every
TAA dollar spent. 36 The retraining goal that first began to draw attention after the
32. See id. at 1-9 for a summary of the bills.
33. A detailed study of dismissals from steel plants in Youngstown, Ohio found that the officials of
the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (OBES) administered TAA and other available programs
with enthusiasm, but that their adjustment efforts, beyond the provision of cash benefits, were largely
unsuccessful. See T. Buss & F REDBURNS, SHUTDOWN AT YOUNGSTOWN 108 (1983). It concludes
that the failure of the OBES to achieve its reemployment goals was a function of the "complex
interaction between several fundamental shortcomings of employment service delivery systems,
which ... are not particular to the Youngstown area." Id. at 109. The study states that the primary
problems with the system were the lack of information regarding available jobs in the community, the
tendency to fund retraining without evidence of demand for the skills being developed, and the
encouragement of relocation without knowledge of job availability. Id. at 111.
34. American Steel Industry-Statement on the Revitalization Program, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1960, 1967-69 (Sept. 30, 1980) (based on the conclusions of an ad hoc committee of govern-
ment, management, and labor representatives created to evaluate and facilitate aid to steel workers).
35. See STEEL TRIPARTITE ADVISORY COMM., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMU-
NITY AND LABOR ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE 1, 3-5, 7 (1980).
36. The 1981 amendments did not change the length of time for which a TAA qualified worker is
eligible for cash benefits-52 weeks plus 26 additional weeks when he or she is enrolled in an
approved training program. Compare 19 U.S.C. 2293 (1976) with 19 U.S.C. 2293 (1982). However,
by limiting benefit amounts to state unemployment insurance payment levels, the amendment not
only ensured that import injured workers receive exactly the same cash compensation as all other
unemployed individuals during the period they are eligible for unemployment payments, it also
ensured that during periods in which federal extended unemployment benefits are avaiable, TAA cash
payments would generally be available only to those in retraining.
Prior to 1981, the size of TAA weekly cash benefits equaled 70 percent of a certified worker's wage
(not to exceed 70 percent of the average weekly manufacturing wage) reduced by any amount of
payable unemployment benefits. 19 U.S.C. § 2292 (1976). In most states, weekly unemployment
benefits equal approximately 50 percent of weekly wages. P. HONIGSBERG, THE UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS HANDBOOK 22 (1981) (The appendix describes the exact methods of calculating weekly
benefit amounts in each state.) Under the unamended version of TAA, workers receiving unemploy-
ment benefits equaling 50 percent of their weekly wages would, if TAA qualified, receive TAA cash
benefits amounting to 20 percent of their wages. Thus, prior to 1981, TAA certified workers received
some amount of compensation for import injury regardless of whether they were receiving unemploy-
ment benefits. The 1981 amendment, by limiting TAA cash payments to the level of unemployment
benefits in each certified worker's state, insured that import injured workers receive only the same
amount of money as all other unemployed workers for as long as they are eligible for unemployment
payments. 19 U.S.C. § 2293 (1982).
The 1981 ceiling on cash allowances further limits the availabilty of compensation for import
injured workers during difficult economic periods. In most states "regular" unemployment payments
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enactment of the Trade Act of 1974 thus obtained at least a limited place in the
law. These amendments, however, remain the only, and a minor, legislative
reflection of post-1974 Congressional interest in retraining as a core goal of TAA.
The interplay of the free market and compensation principles that shaped the first
program continues to define the two major procedures required in the operation
of TAA: "certification," including the application procedures required of work-
ers and the investigative procedures followed by the Department of Labor as well
as the substantive standards that workers must meet in order to qualify for
assistance; and "distribution," encompassing the means by which the govern-
ment administers assistance.
C. Current Program Procedures: Maintainance of the Original Goals
1. Certification.
A worker petition continues to be a prerequisite to adjustment assistance. The
Department of Labor, which is responsible for certification investigations,37 is
prohibited from seeking out individuals or groups of workers for federal as-
sistance. Rather, three or more employees from a single company, their author-
ized union, or another authorized representative must initiate the certification
process.38 Government intervention in private adjustment thus continues to be
limited to those enterprises in which at least some workers desire assistance.
are provided for 26 weeks. P. HONIGSBERO, supra, at 24. If this were the full extent of available
unemployment benefits, the compensation provided import injured workers would, despite the limita-
tion on amount, be considerable. Following expiration of unemployment benefits, TAA would, for
the remaining 24 weeks of the 52 week TAA payment period, provide TAA workers with cash
benefits equal to state unemployment benefits. Since 1970, however, federally mandated extended
benefits have provided workers with 13 weeks of additional benefits whenever national or state
unemployment rates surpass specified levels. See id.; S. WADNER, A PROPOSAL FOR A PROGRAM
PAYING UI BENEFrrs BEYOND 39 WEEKS 2 and Appendix A (1980). This reduces significantly the
additional cash compensation available to import injured workers. Furthermore, during recessionary
periods, emergency measures have provided additional payments, sometimes making the combined
benefit period as long as 65 weeks. S. WADNER, supra, at 2. When the 1981 amendments were
enacted, such emergency measures were in place, allowing for over 52 weeks of unemployment
benefit payments in nearly every state. Telephone conversation with Ellen Blum, Legislative Assistant
to Senator Metzenbaum, November, 1983. (notes on file, Michigan Yearbook of International Legal
Studies). Thus, cash benefits were limited to workers who entered retraining upon the expiration of
their unemployment insurance benefits.
37. 19 U.S.C. § 2273(a) (1982). Departmental regulations specify that investigations will be
carried out under the supervision of the director of the Office of Tade Adjustment Assistance. 29
C.FR. § 90.2 (1984).
38. 29 C.FR. § 90. 1 l(a)(b). Although the Department cannot initiate the certification process, it is
required to investigate all properly filed worker petitions for assistance. 19 U.S.C. § 2273(a) (1982).
The closest the Trade Act comes to enpowering the Department to initiate an investigation absent a
worker petition is the requirement that the Department, upon notification from the International Trade
Commission (ITC) of the commencement of an escape clause investigation for import injury relief to
an industry, undertake a study of workers in that industry who are likely to be eligible for assistance.
19 U.S.C. § 2274(a) (1982). The findings of the study are delivered to the President and published in
the Federal Register. 19 U.S.C. § 2274(b) (1982). Prior to the 1981 amendments, the Department was
also required to provide program information to potential recipients of adjustment assistance if the
ITC made an affirmative finding regarding import relief. 19 U.S.C. § 1174(c) (1976) (repealed 1981).
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Substantive certification requirements and the investigation procedures used
by the Department to ensure that they are met by workers receiving certification
reflect a desire to maintain the compensatory nature of TAA. The Labor Depart-
ment is to certify petitioning workers only if it determines:
(1) that a significant number or proportion of the workers in the petitioning workers'
firm or an appropriate subdivision of the firm have become totally or partially
separated, or are threatened to become totally or partially separated,
(2) that sales or production, or both, of such firm or subdivision have decreased
absolutely, and
(3) that increases of imports of articles like or directly competitive with articles
produced by such workers' firm or an appropriate subdivision thereof contributed
importantly to such total or partial separation, or threat thereof, and to such decline
in sales or production.
39
Administrative and judicial definition of when increased imports "contributed
importantly" to a decline in sales or production and layoffs, 4° and when workers
"produce" an article that is "like or directly competitive with" an imported
good, 4' should distinguish between those workers who are import-injured and
those workers who are not. Such interpretations have failed, however, to provide
a useful bright-line test for application of the "contributed importantly"
standard.
While the measurable facts involved make it relatively simple to find that a
significant number of workers at a firm have been laid off, that the sales or
production of a firm has declined absolutely, and that there has been an increase
in imports of a particular product, 42 the determinations that the increase in im-
ports "contributed importantly" to layoffs or a decrease in sales and that the
petitioning worker "produced" an "article that is like or directly competitive
with" an imported good have proved complex.
The "contributed importantly" standard is particulary difficult as it demands
an assessment of the more nebulous cause and effect relationships between the
three factual determinations. To obtain information upon which to make the
"contributed importantly" assessment, the Department conducts customer sur-
veys of the petitioning workers' firms to determine whether there was any change
in their import buying habits that correlates with the decline in sales of the
product produced at the workers' firms. 4
3
39. 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (1982 & Supp. 11 1983-1985).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 2272(3) (Supp. 11 1983-1985).
41. 19 U.S.C. § 2272(3) (Supp. 11 1983-1985).
42. An investigation by the General Accounting Office of the problems encountered in administer-
ing TAA does not refer to the determination of either of the first two requirements. In order to
determine the third-whether there has been an increase in the level of imports of a particular
product-the Department develops an industry study containing the competitive product's descrip-
tion, an industry perspective, the level of import and export of the product, and consumption data.
There appears to be little disatisfaction with this portion of Department investigations. GEN. Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-82-121, INFORMATION ON THE 1974 TRADE ACT WORKER ADJUST-
MENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM CERTIFICATION PROCESS 3 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CERTIFICATION
PROCESS].
43. See id. at 3-4.
WORKER ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE 455
Disappointed applicants have challenged the accuracy of information obtained
through these surveys. Although the courts have generally deferred to Depart-
ment findings, 44 officials responsible for investigations themselves acknowledge
the substantial limitations of the survey method. First, it is difficult to determine
to whom surveys should be distributed. Firms are often reluctant to provide
complete customer lists because they consider such information confidential.
Second, customers who respond to such surveys often represent a small, nonpro-
jectable sample of a firm's sales. Finally, though officials admit that information
often appears inconsistent or inaccurate, they have been unable to devise a
method of verification.
45
Even when adequate information can be obtained, the Department finds it
difficult to define and apply the "contributed importantly" standard.46 Statutory
language provides little guidance-a cause that contributes importantly is "a
cause which is important, but not necessarily more important than any other
cause." 47 The Act's legislative history is only slightly more definitive. The Sen-
ate report states that the effect of imports must "be significantly more than de
minimus."48 If dismissals and declines in sales or production would have been
the same regardless of the increased imports, the petitioning workers cannot be
certified. 49 Although this is helpful in determining when import injury is inade-
quate to warrant assistance, it provides scant guidance as to when it is adequate.
Although the Department has concluded that the "contributed importantly"
test cannot be reduced to specific procedures, 50 the standard has clearly limited
the scope of both investigations and certifications. Under the language of the Act
a union, such as the United Auto Workers, representing workers at many differ-
ent firms, could theoretically affect the private adjustment process of an entire
industry on the basis of a single certification request.5' However, when a petition
is filed on behalf of workers from different firms or even all of the workers at a
single, multi-plant enterprise, the Department usually examines each plant indi-
vidually and generally limits group certification to a plant or plant division. 52 The
Department argues that the plant is the largest subdivision permitting the Secre-
44. See, e.g., Local 167, International Molders & Allied Workers' Union v. Marshall, 643 F2d 26
(lst Cir. 1981) (upholding the Department's denial of certification over the petitioners' argument that
the Department's survey was inadequate because it failed to detect relative import substitution and was
submitted to less than all of the producing firm's customers).
45. See CERTIFICATION PROCESS, supra note 42, at cover letter and 4-5.
46. Id. at 6.
47. 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (Supp. 11 1983-1985).
48. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 18, at 133.
49. See id.
50. CERTIFICATION PROCESS, supra note 42, at 6.
51. See, e.g., UAW v. Marshall, 584 F2d 390, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
52. See id. at 391-97; UAW v. Marshall, 627 F2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Although individual plant
investigations are not required by either the 'rade Act of 1974 or the Code of Federal Regulations, see
29 C.FR. § 90.12 (1984), these two cases indicate that the Department's general practice is to
investigate separately each plant covered by a petition involving multiplant enterprises and to limit
certifications to plants or plant divisions. It should be noted, however, that these two opinions
sometimes fail to distinguish the problem of defining an appropriate subdivision for investigations
from the problem of defining an appropriate subdivision for certification. For an example of an
opinion dealing strictly with the latter, see Paden v. Dep't of Labor, 562 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1977).
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tary to differentiate between separations to which an increase in imports "con-
tributed importantly" and separations to which it did not.
5 3
A Department memorandum justifying the use of the plant-by-plant investiga-
tion procedure states that "the Secretary's broad discretion to establish the appro-
priate subdivision . . . should be utilized to seek out specific import related
situations within a firm, even though certification would not be warranted if only
firm experience in total was subject to import-impact analysis."4 It elaborates:
Congressional guidance on how "contributed importantly" is to be interpreted and
applied governs the Secretary's approach in determining the appropriate subdivision
in any given case. The Secretary has to consider seasonal, cyclical and tech-
nological impacts on employment and other factors which may be "dominant"
causes of unemployment. All of these may impact differently on different firms
and/or segments of firms. 5
The Department's comments recognize that the size of the entity examined
may render a certification over- or under-inclusive. It may be, as the first com-
ment suggests, that the loss of sales to imports suffered by a firm as a whole is
too small in comparison to its overall sales to have contributed importantly to
layoffs. Yet, if all of those losses were due to the decline in sales of a product
produced at one plant within the enterprise, a plant-level investigation might
enable the Department to find that the effect of increased imports on layoffs met
the "significantly more than de minimus" requirement set forth in the Senate
Report.
5 6
Conversely, in a situation in which increased imports did contribute impor-
tantly to layoffs throughout an entire enterprise or industry, it is possible that
particular plants within the enterprise, or enterprises within the industry, suffered
sales losses from something other than import competition and would have been
forced to carry out layoffs regardless of the increased competition from abroad.
To award the unemployed workers of such plants adjustment assistance would
provide them with a windfall not foreseen by Congress.
The development of a test for the requirement that assisted workers "produce"
an article that is "like or directly competitive with" an imported article57 has
proved nearly as difficult as the definition of the "contributed importantly"
standard. If strictly applied, this requirement would force the Department to
discriminate first between workers who manufacture a particular finished product
and workers who produce a component for that product, and second between
workers who are directly involved in the creation of a good and workers who
provide services necessary to the production of that good. Rather than attempting
to draw such distinctions among individual workers, the Department has chosen
to apply this standard through what might be called a "corporate structure" test.
53. UAW v. Marshall, 584 E2d at 396.
54. UAW v. Marshall, 627 F2d at 561 n.3 (quoting from the Memorandum of Recommendation of
the Office of Tnade Adjustment Assistance, adopted by the Secretary of Labor as a "clarification of
the Department's reasons concerning the determination of 'an appropriate subdivision'" id.).
55. Id.
56. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
57. 19 U.S.C. § 2272(3) (1982 & Supp. I1 1983-1985).
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The Department looks first to the item sold by the workers' employer. If it is a
product, as opposed to a service, the Department determines if it can be "sub-
stituted for" or "interchanged with" the imported good that has presumably
caused the sales decline. If it can, the petitioning workers in the plants or the
plant divisions involved in the product's manufacture may be certified. 8 If the
product is not interchangeable with the imported good but is only a component of
a product that is interchangeable with the imported good, the eligibility of the
workers will depend on the corporate structure of the company for which they
work. Workers manufacturing component parts for a subsidiary of a corporation
selling the import-competitive good will be certified. But employees of an inde-
pendent manufacturer of a component part will be deemed to have failed the
"substitutable for" or "interchangeable with" requirement and will not be cer-
tified even though the good they produce may be sold to manufacturers of the
import-impacted good.
59
In any plant or plant division that produces a product held to be like or directly
competitive with the imported product, there will be some workers who provide
services essential to production, but who are not technically part of the produc-
tion process. Rather than discriminating between "line workers" and their
equally unemployed co-workers without whose services production could not
take place, the Department will certify all of the workers in a certifiable plant or
division. 6° In contrast, the eligibility of service workers who, though ultimately
employees of a manufacturer of the import-impacted good, work at a corporate
subdivision or a plant division that provides only associated services, will depend
on whether their services transform the existing product into a different article,
thus causing something new to enter into the stream of commerce. 6' Employees
of service firms that are not managed, owned, or controlled by a manufacturer of
an import-impacted product are excluded from the Act's program.
62
Although the prohibition against government initiation of adjustment as-
sistance affords some protection to market forces (at least insofar as the "mar-
ket" may be defined as a product of private demand rather than government
direction), the certification component of TAA, in its sometimes complex en-
deavor to identify workers who have truly suffered import injury, is most signifi-
cantly influenced by the compensation principle. The strength of the free market
principle's influence on TAA is seen more clearly in the program's distribution
requirements.
2. Distribution
While the federal government through the Department of Labor carries out the
certification procedures of TAA, distribution of cash benefits and supervision of
the administration of employment services, including retraining, is left to state
58. Gropper v. Donovan, 569 E Supp. 883, 887 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) (citing Machine Printers and
Engravers Association of the United States v. Marshall, 595 E2d 860, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
59. ACTWU Local 1627 v. Donovan, 587 F Supp. 74 (Ct. Int'l rade 1984).
60. Abbott v. Donovan, 570 E Supp. 41, 49 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
61. Nagy v. Donovan, 571 E Supp. 1261, 1264 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) (citing Pemberton v. Marshall,
639 F2d 798, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
62. Woodrum v. Donovan, 564 E Supp. 826, 832-33 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
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employment insurance officials. Once the Department certifies a plant division,
state officials, acting as agents of the federal government, must determine
whether the affected employees are individually eligible for benefits6 3 including
cash allowances, 64 counseling, testing, placement and employment support ser-
vices, 65 retraining, 66 and job search67 and relocation allowances. 6
The distribution procedures of TAA reflect an intent to preserve market choices
regarding shifts in the labor force. Assistance, other than cash benefits, is geared
toward matching laborers with existing employment opportunities. Training of
any type is clearly a second choice to the provision of services promoting imme-
diate reemployment. In fact, training is not even an option unless the state
employment insurance office determines that there "is no suitable employment
available for a worker." 69 Even when no jobs are available, employment insur-
ance officials may only approve of training if it would benefit the worker70 "and
there is a reasonable expectation of employment following completion of such
training." 7' Furthermore, the statute requires that employment officials, insofar
as possible, provide on-the-job training,72 thus demonstrating a preference for
existing market demand rather than jobs in industries with future potential
growth.
Finally, even if state employment insurance officials determine that a given
labor market area is suffering a high level of unemployment, suitable employ-
ment opportunities are not available, and suitable training is available, they can
suspend the cash benefits of workers refusing to accept training or actively search
for work outside of the area.73 Theoretically, this enables state officials to ensure
that workers receiving assistance follow the indications of the market in seeking
new jobs.
D. Alternatives to TAA: Shifting the Balance?
Despite the 1981 amendment, or perhaps because it actually did little to shift
the program's focus, 74 TAA continues to be criticized by both proponents and
critics of federal adjustment assistance. All argue that the current program's
certification and distribution procedures result in inefficient administration of
assistance, applicant backlog, and limited retraining. Expansionists seek a larger
63. 289 C.FR. § 91.6 (1984). State employment insurance agencies apply a federally standardized
test set out in the Code of Federal Regulations. 29 C.FR. § 91.7 (1984).
64. 19 U.S.C. § 2292(a) (1982). The 1981 amendment decreased cash benefits from 70 percent of a
worker's salary, 19 U.S.C. § 2292(a) (1976), to a level equal to the unemployment benefit amount in
each eligible worker's state. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
65. 19 U.S.C. § 2295 (1982).
66. 19 U.S.C. § 2292 (1982 & Supp. H 1983-1985).
67. 19 U.S.C. § 2297 (1982 & Supp. I 1983-1985).
68. 19 U.S.C. § 2298 (1982).
69. 19 U.S.C. § 2296(a)(1)(A) (1982).
70. 19 U.S.C. § 2296(a)(1)(B) (1982).
71. 19 U.S.C. § 2296(a)(1)(C) (1982).
72. 19 U.S.C. § 2296(a) (1982).
73. 19 U.S.C. § 2291(b) (1982).
74. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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federal government role on the grounds that TAA can and should serve the
broader policy goals of industrial growth in the United States. The current Ad-
ministration, contending that federal assistance is unnecessary given the avail-
ability of state-administered manpower programs, argues that TAA should be
eliminated because the import injury requirement and the distinctions that the
Labor Department is forced to draw in applying it75 improperly discriminate
among similarly situated workers.
1. Enlarging the Role of the Federal Government
The expansionists blame TAA's failure to move workers into new jobs on the
certification and distribution procedures that limit government involvement in
adjustment because of the confines of the free market and compensation princi-
ples. Convinced of the potential effectiveness of federal coordination of labor
adjustment, expansionists propose modifications to TAA's procedures that would
increase federal involvement in adjustment and thus, they argue, promote more
efficient movement of labor into growth industries.
7 6
Harold A. Bratt, former Deputy Director of the Office of Trade Adjustment
Assistance of the Department of Labor, proposes a government-initiated, indus-
try-wide investigation and certification process. 7 Citing the backlog of worker
initiated petitions filed between 1976 and 1982 and "the somewhat artificial
distinction" created by certifying workers on a plant or plant-division basis, he
suggests that a less strict standard, together with a single industry-wide, govern-
ment-initiated investigation for determining worker eligibility, would result in
faster delivery of assistance. 78 He argues, for example, that aid to auto, steel, and
footwear workers in the late 1970s would have been available more quickly had
the Department been able to undertake industry-wide investigations rather than
the "piecemeal, plant-by-plant" examinations required by the statute and current
Department of Labor practices.7 9
Harold W. Williams, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade Adjustment
Assistance from 1981 to 1982 and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic
Development responsible for the management of TAA between 1977 and 1981,
75. See supra note 39-62 and accompanying text.
76. This note focuses on the proposals of what might be called moderate expansionists-those
who would maintain, at least formally, some form of import injury test as a prerequisite to adjustment
assistance. Other, more radical expansionists would abandon the restraints of the compensation and
free market principles altogether and provide adjustment assistance to workers suffering structural
and cyclical unemployment of all varieties, regardless of its relation to import injury. See, e.g., H.R.
2267, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (providing, among other things, special extensions of credit,
health insurance, and retraining for dislocated workers); H.R. 807, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)
(authorizing the Secretary of Labor to investigate proposed plant closings or relocations and to
provide assistance to certain affected employees, businesses, and local governments); H.R. 5040,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (proposing new mechanisms of federal control to prevent or minimize
the harmful effects of unemployment on employees when businesses change production methods or
plant locations); see also LABOR UNION STUDY TOUR PARTICIPANTS, ECONOMIC DISLOCATION-
PLATrr CLOSINGS, PLANT RELOCATIONS AND PLANT CONVERSION 32-34 (1979).
77. See Bratt, Issues in Worker Certification and Questions of Future Direction in the Trade
Adjustment Assistance Program, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 819, 855-56 (1982).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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puts forward another more strongly expansionist proposal.80 Like Bratt, Williams
supports a government-initiated, industry-wide investigation procedure that
would empower a single federal agency to determine when an industry has been
harmed or seriously threatened by imports.8' But, whereas Bratt would allow the
federal agency to investigate entire industries, implicitly suggesting that certifica-
tion might be granted on a sub-industry basis, Williams' proposal explicitly states
that certification should only be provided to industries, not individual firms or
groups of workers.82
Moreover, Williams would reshape the distribution methods of the current
program. Under Williams' proposal, all of the technological and worker adjust-
ment problems of a particular industry would be simultaneously addressed. Upon
a determination that an industry had suffered or was about to suffer injury, a
federally organized committee consisting of representatives from management,
labor, and government would prepare a plan to reinvigorate the industry.83 No
assistance would be provided to anyone within the industry until the federal
government approved of the plan. 4 Williams suggests that the plan might subsi-
dize worker retraining and relocation, research and development, and below-
market credit for companies.85
Williams' proposal would significantly increase the involvement of the federal
government in industry adjustment. The federal government would not only have
to approve initial adjustment plans, but it also would retain the right to revoke
assistance if any labor or management party failed to carry out its designated
obligations .86
Although formally retaining the import injury requirement, Bratt's and
Williams' proposals both explicitly and implicitly weaken the link between ad-
justment assistance and federal trade policies. They would broaden the definition
of import injury and allow the federal government to carry out industry-wide
certifications, thus increasing the possibility that workers suffering job loss from
80. Oversight of Trade Adjustment Assistance Programs and Authorization of Appropriations for
U.S. Trade Representative, International Trade Commission, and Customs Service: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 242, 243 (1983)
(statement of Harold W. Williams, President, Industrial Policy Council) [hereinafter cited as Williams
Statement].
81. Id. at 255. Williams suggests that the responsibility for certification might be given to the
International RTade Commission. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 255-56. Williams is not the only critic to have suggested that trade readjustment
assistance be administered by a tripartite committee. Similar proposals have been forwarded by both
organized labor and legislators. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REc. S3400 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1983) (state-
ment of Sen. Heinz in support of S. 849 which would have amended the 1974 rade Act to allow for
greater import relief to industries in exchange for the cooperation of the labor and management of any
requesting industry in creating a comprehensive industry-wide adjustment plan); Hearing on the
Industrial Competitiveness Act, H.R. 4360, and Related Acts, Before the Econ. Stabilization Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 55 (1983)
(statement of Lane Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO, in support of a tripartite board to oversee labor and
industry adjustment).
84. Williams Statement, supra note 80, at 255-56.
85. Id. at 255-56.
86. Id. at 256.
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market cycles or the inefficiencies of their firms would benefit from the import-
related job loss of others.
A number of other expansionist suggestions for speeding the certification
process would, in one way or another, also weaken the compensation/import
injury restraint on government intervention in the labor market. Many set forth
certain broad categories of workers to whom assistance would be provided with-
out proof of import injury. They would, for example, automatically provide aid to
workers in industries for which the United States had negotiated export restraints
with foreign suppliers, 87 to workers dismissed due to plant closures (if closure
were part of a plan for future adjustment) 8 or to plant relocation overseas, 9 to
workers in export industries who lost their jobs because foreign governments
subsidized exports in third countries, 90 and to workers who manufactured prod-
ucts against which foreign governments had erected non-tariff barriers. 91 As in
the case of industry-wide certification, application of such broad objective tests
would inevitably result in the certification of workers whose job loss is not
actually due to increased imports.
Measures for reducing the role of the market in the distribution of assistance
have also been suggested. For example, a bill introduced in the Senate in 1983,
while not proposing to give the federal government greater control over adjust-
ment, would have made at least three modifications in the current market-
oriented distribution procedures to allow individual workers a greater say in the
skills they might obtain through federally funded retraining. 92 First, the bill
would have made funding an entitlement, 93 thus eliminating the possibility that
an applicant might be denied training because appropriations had run out.
Second, it would have required retraining unless work of a "substantially equal
or higher skill level" was available 94 rather than allowing retraining only in the
absence of "suitable employment."- 95 Finally, the bill would have clarified TAA's
current requirement that there be "a reasonable expectation of employment"
following training. 96 Under the existing program, current labor market demands
weigh heavily in decisions to fund retraining. 97 By specifying that "reasonable
expectation" does not mean that employment opportunities for a worker must be
available or offered immediately upon completion of training, 98 the bill would
have diluted this market constraint, shifting the emphasis from immediate market
87. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ISSUE BRIEF No. 1B83135,
TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE 6 (Aug. 17, 1983) [hereinafter cited as ISSUE BRIEF]; Bratt, supra
note 77, at 856.
88. Bratt, supra note 77, at 856.
89. See H.R. 3391, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1983).
90. ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 87, at 6.
91. Id.
92. S. 749, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
93. Id. at § 1(a)(1).
94. Id. at § 4(a).
95. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
98. S. 749, supra note 92, at § 1(a)(2).
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demands to the development of skills that individual workers believe will be of
future value.
2. Eliminating the Role of the Federal Government
In sharp contrast to the expansionists, the Reagan Administration would al-
most completely eliminate federal government participation in worker adjust-
ment.99 Claiming that TAA is not cost effective, that it is not targeted to those
most in need, and that it is duplicative and does not effectively carry out its
purpose, the Administration has suggested that TAA be subsumed in the existing
network of state social welfare programs.l°0
The Administration's proposal would eliminate all federal readjustment allow-
ances to import-injured workers, as well as federal oversight of the administra-
tion of employment services, training, and relocation benefits.' 0' Citing the
availability of unemployment insurance to all workers as well as supplementary
unemployment benefits and severance pay under labor-management agreements
to a significant number, the administration argues against singling out any work-
ers for additional assistance. It suggests that "workers who have lost their jobs
through no fault of their own should be treated similarly regardless of the reasons
for job loss."102
Supporting its proposal on more practical grounds, the Administration asserts
that research on unemployment insurance indicates that the extra cash benefits
99. Amendments enacted in 1981 have already substantially reduced federal benefits to import-
impacted workers. See supra note 36.
100. This note focuses on the Administration's most recent proposal which was presented to
Congress in February 1985. See Fiscal Year 1986 Authorizations for the U.S. Service, International
Trade Commission, U.S. Trade Representative; and Trade Recommendations for Report to the Budget
Committee, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 237, 240 (1985) (statement of Patrick O'Keefe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Labor) [hereinafter cited as 1985 O'Keefe Testimony].
In 1983, the Administration put forth a more ambitious proposal to restrict TAA. As in its current
proposal, the Administration suggested that benefits for import impacted workers be limited to the
benefits available to all unemployed workers under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1651-1658 (1982). Oversight of Trade Adjustment Assistance Programs and Authorization
of Appropriations for U.S. Trade Representative, International Trade Commission, and Customs
Service: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 211-13 (1983) (statement of Joyce Kaiser, Assistant Secretary for Employment and 'raining,
Dep't of Labor). In addition, it suggested that Congress amend the current state unemployment
insurance program to address structural and cyclical unemployment. Id. at 213. Under existing
federal law a state may use unemployment trust funds only for payment of cash benefits to unem-
ployed workers. Id. The Administration's proposal would have allowed states to use these funds to
pay for training and relocation of unemployed workers. According to the Administration, the change
would have permitted states to tailor their assistance to the needs of the long-term, structurally
unemployed by encouraging individuals suffering permanent job loss to undergo retraining and
relocation. Id. Finally, the Administration recommended that Congress amend the Federal Supple-
mental Compensation Act. Id. Under the unmodified plan, workers with previous labor force attach-
ments who have exhausted all regular benefits, are eligible for income maintenance payments. Under
the Administration's 1983 proposal, workers would have been able to forego their cash benefits for
vouchers entitling employers who hired them to credits against their state or federal unemployment
tax or federal income tax liabilities. Id.
101. 1985 O'Keefe Testimony, supra note 100, at 240.
102. Id.
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provided TAA-certified workers in retraining acts as a disincentive to job search
and thus lengthens the period of unemployment. 0 3 In addition, the Administra-
tion argues that the fact that most workers eligible for TAA have taken advantage
only of the cash benefits, and not the retraining or other adjustment assistance
services, justifies the elimination of adjustment allowances.
104
To offer training to workers currently receiving trade adjustment assistance,
the Administration would rely on the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)' 05-
the most recent manifestation of the "manpower" programs in the Area Redevel-
opment and Comprehensive Employment and Training Acts°6-and the fairly
new and as yet untried concept of individual training accounts (ITAs).10 7 Under
the Administration's proposal, trade-impacted skilled workers would be forced to
seek retraining in the same manner as all other unemployed workers-through
reliance on their personal savings and the JTPA.108
The JTPA is administered by state governors' offices and local Private Industry
Councils (PICs) designed to ensure the active involvement of the private sector in
retraining decisions. 09 The federal government's role is limited. Its sole responsi-
bility, in addition to matching state funds dollar for dollar with federal money,"0
is the specification of performance standards against which state programs are to
be evaluated."'
According to the Administration, one of the major advantages of the JTPA is
that it avoids the lengthy petitioning process of TAA." 2 Each state is responsible
for establishing procedures to identify substantial groups of eligible individuals
who have been laid off or received notice of layoff, who are eligible for or have
exhausted unemployment compensation and are unlikely to return to their pre-
vious jobs," 3 who have lost their jobs as a result of plant closure," 4 or who are
long-term unemployed with little chance for obtaining jobs in the area in which
103. Id. at 240-43. But see the questions of Congressman Gibbons and Congressman Pease
regarding the reliability of such data. Id. at 241-44.
104. Id. at 240.
105. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1781 (1982).
106. For a summary of the development of "manpower" training programs, see Gutman, Job
Training Partnership Act: New Help for the Unemployed, MoNTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1983, at 3.
107. See Retraining of Displaced Worker, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Banking and Urban
Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (statement of Patrick O'Keefe, Deputy
Assistance Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor) [hereinafter cited as O'Keefe ITA Testimony]. The
committee report notes that due to the speed with which the hearing was organized, Mr. O'Keefe
presented his personal views, rather than the formal position of the Department. Id.
108. In addition to serving dislocated workers. JTPA provides training assistance to disadvantaged
adults and youths, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1603 (1982), native Americans, 29 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982), and
migrant and seasonal farmworkers, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1672 (1982).
109. S. REP. No. 469, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 1654(a)(1) (1982). When the average rate of unemployment in a state is higher
than the average rate of unemployment for all states, the non-federal matching funds required by
section (a)(l) will be reduced by ten percent for each one percent that the state unemployment rate
exceeds the national average. 29 U.S.C. § 1654(a)(2).
Ill. 29 U.S.C. § 1516(g) (1982).
112. 1985 O'Keefe Testimony, supra note 100, at 240.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 1652(a)(1) (1982).
114. 29 U.S.C. § 1652(a)(2) (1982).
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they reside. "5 At the discretion of the state, PICs may be involved in the certifica-
tion process.ll 6 When a group of workers is certified as eligible for assistance, the
state, in conjunction with the PICs, determines whether any job opportunities
exist within the local labor market area for which such individuals could be
retrained."' The state is responsible for determining whether training oppor-
tunities for such employment opportunities exist within the local labor market
area. 118
While the Administration's proposed reliance on the JTPA would shift respon-
sibility for assisting trade impacted workers from the federal government to the
states, implementation of the individual training account concept would largely
remove retraining decisions from even state government direction. If a program
based on the ITA concept were enacted," 9 it would enable a worker and his or her
employer to open a joint account into which they would both make deposits and
from which the worker could draw funds to finance retraining in the event of
involuntary job loss. 20 Both could deduct deposits from their income tax assess-
ments.'"' The funds would not be available for any use other than retraining
following permanent layoff. Workers seeking to use the funds would be issued
vouchers through their state employment insurance offices.' At the time of a
worker's retirement, or in the case of disability, unused funds would be divided
between the worker and the employer.23 The federal government would not
contribute funds or lend administrative guidance to the program. The only federal
cost incurred would be lost tax revenues. 124
An Administration spokesperson from the Labor Department has endorsed the
use of ITAs for all dislocated workers. 2 5 He commends the aspects of the pro-
gram which give it a strong market orientation and he argues that it is, most
importantly, voluntary, thus allowing employees and workers, in the context of
collective bargaining, to decide "how the compensation package is to be allo-
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1652(a)(3) (1982).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 1652(b) (1982).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1652(c)(1) (1982).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1652(c)(2) (1982).
119. Two bills incorporating the ITA concept were presented to Congress in 1984, the National
Individual Retirement Account Act, H.R. 4832, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H706 (daily
ed. Feb.9, 1984) and the National TRaining Incentives Act, H.R. 5519, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., 130
CONG. REC. HI,716 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1984). Both were referred to the Committee on Ways and
Means and the Committee on Education and Labor and both appear to have died with the expiration of
the 98th Congress. See Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., Legislative Calendar 333,346 (final
ed., Dec. 1984); Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., Legislative Calendar 97, 104 (final
ed., Dec. 1984). For a convenient summary of these two bills, see Retraining Displaced Workers,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The discription of ITAs in the text of this note is taken from the National
Individual Raining Account Act. The National Taining Incentives Act differs mainly in that it allows
workers to withdraw savings from Individual Retraining Accounts without the usual penalties, if the
money is used for retraining.
120. Id. at 220 (facts on the National Individual Taining Account Act).
121. Id. at 222.
122. Id. at 221.
123. Id. at 222.
124. Id. at 221.
125. O'Keefe ITA Testimony, supra note 107, at 55.
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cated across a full spectrum of benefits-wages, leisure, training, and so on. 126
He also cites its flexibility, which he believes will allow workers to determine
their interests and aspirations as job seekers. 27
The Administration's proposal, with its reliance on the JTPA and ITAs, would
eliminate rather than amend TAA. In placing workers who have lost their jobs as
a result of increased imports on the same footing as all other unemployed workers
the Administration denies that a society that benefits from liberalized trade
should compensate those who suffer the consequences of increased international
competition.
II. THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE WITH ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE
Within the large industrial corporations of Japan, worker adjustment is basi-
cally a private undertaking. 128 Retraining and reassignment of the skilled
industrial workforce is generally carried out by management and company-wide
unions within the framework of a lifetime employment system. 129 However, in the
aftermath of the oil shock of 1973-1974 management appeared prepared to
abandon lifetime employment and the system of private adjustment associated
with it. The government response included the repeal of existing Unemployment
Insurance Law, the implementation of measures to counter increasing job loss
among the skilled labor force, and the improvement of basic unemployment
benefits. 130 Reflecting neither the compensation nor the free market principles
126. Id. at 57.
127. Id. at 57.
128. See Kanabayashi, Japan's Recession-Hit Companies Make Complex Arrangements to Avoid
Layoffs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1983, at 34; Hanami, Worker Motivation in Japan-Il, JAPAN LAB.
BULL., Mar. 1, 1982, at 5, 6-7 [hereinafter cited as Worker Motivation-l].
129. J. OR, H. SHIMADA, & A. SEIKE, UNITED STATES-JAPAN COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EMPLOY-
MENT ADJUSTMENT 13 (March 1985) [hereinafter cited as COMPARATIVE STUDY]. Private adjustment
and lifetime employment, as discussed in this note, are not universally practiced within the Japanese
workforce. Since the mid-1950s permanent employment has been part of the industrial relations
systems of a substantial number of large- and mid-sized firms. Smaller firms, however, rarely utilize
the system. Galeson & Odaka, The Japanese Labor Market, in ASIA'S NEW GIANT 587, 614 (H.
Patrick & H. Rosovsky eds. 1976). This note focuses on the adjustment of workers associated with
large- and mid-sized firms. It should be noted, however, that it is, in part, the non-permanent status of
workers in smaller firms that contract to perform services for larger firms that makes lifetime
employment in the larger firms feasible. Small subcontracting firms often handle non-production
work including construction, maintenance, and loading. Peak production demands are also frequently
met through increased use of subcontracted workers. When demand declines, large companies allow
their contracts with smaller firms to lapse. Since the tradition of lifetime employment is often not part
of the ethic of small firms, all of their employees are subject to dismissal. Despite the fact that many
subcontractors work exclusively for a single firm and may even be located on the same site as their
contracting firms, the employees of subcontractors, together with temporary workers at larger firms,
bear the burden of workforce reductions. Large firms essentially shift the risk of dismissal from their
permanent employees to the employees of smaller firms. See id. at 619-21; COMPTROLLER GEN.,
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/ID-82-32, INDUSTRIAL POLICY: JAPAN'S FLEXIBLE APPROACH
75-76 (1982) [hereinafter cited as JAPAN'S FLEXIBLE APPROACH]; Koshiro, The Quality of Working
Life, in CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 81-83 (T. Shirai ed. 1985); E. VOGEL,
JAPAN As NUMBER ONE 139 (1979).
130. See Employment Insurance Law, Law No. 116 of 1974, as amended by Law No. 33 of 1976,
Law No. 43 of 1977, Law No. 40 of 1978 and Law No. 40 of 1979, translated in [8-HB] EHS L.
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integral to adjustment assistance in the United States,' these provisions en-
powered the Japanese Government to intervene in the marketplace without regard
for the relationship between government policies and job loss. They provided for
two types of assistance: "direct aid," through government-created retraining and
placement programs and job search assistance, and "indirect aid," through sal-
ary subsidies to employers who continued to use private adjustment methods.
The direct aid measures were extensions of the basic unemployment insurance
system enacted in the early post-war period. 3 2 Through these measures, the
Japanese Government provided adjustment assistance similar to that advocated
by proponents of increased government assistance in the United States. 13
3 It
assumed responsibility for deciding where and in what capacity new workers
would be needed and established programs to retrain and relocate workers to
meet those needs. In contrast, through indirect aid provisions, which were not
enacted until the 1970s, the government provided financial assistance to encour-
age management and workers to make their own adjustment decisions.
This section first describes the basic attributes of Japan's private adjustment
system. It then discusses the severe challenge to the system posed by the
1973-1974 oil crisis and analyzes the measures that were enacted to combat its
effect on unemployment. It concludes that the failure of direct aid to promote
worker adjustment suggests that government guidance is not necessarily the
solution to the unemployment problems of skilled workers. 1
34
A. Adjustment in Large Private Enterprises: The Dichotomized Labor
System
Since the late 1950s, the management and unions of large private enterprises
have cooperated to help skilled workers 135 adjust to changing technological and
BULL. SERIES (1983); Hanami, Japan, in WORKFORCE REDUCTIONS IN UNDERTAKINGS 167, 169 (E.
Yemin ed. 1982) (discussing Law Concerning Temporary Measures for Workers Displaced from
Specific Depressed Industries, December 26, 1977, as amended by Law No. 40 of May 8, 1978, Law
No. 107 of November 28, 1978 and Law No. 64 of December 18, 1979).
131. See supra, notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
132. Unemployment Insurance Law, Law No. 146 of 1947, repealed by Employment Insurance
Law, supra note 130, at supplementary provisions art. 2, translated in [8-HA] EHS L. BULL. SERIES,
(1972). The Employment Insurance System, which repealed the Unemployment Insurance Law,
contains both direct and indirect aid methods as well as provisions for basic unemployment benefits.
133. See supra, notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
134. Cf T. UCHINO, JAPAN'S POSTWAR ECONOMY 235 (1978) ("In fact, after the first oil crisis,
labor and management within individual companies collaborated in developing strategies for the
survival of their companies in opposition to government policies aimed at rationalization and re-
organization." Id.). This conclusion contrasts with popular analysis of the effectiveness of govern-
ment guidance of labor adjustment in Japan. See, e.g., Comment, Letting Obsolete Firms Die: Trade
Adjustment Assistance in the United States and Japan, 22 HARVARD INT'L L. J. 595 (1981).
135. In this note, the term "skilled workers" refers to unionized, regular, employees employed by
large- and mid-sized companies. These workers are also referred to as "permanent employees." For
further definition, see infra note 140.
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market demands. 36 Despite the slower economic growth of the past decade,
permanent dismissals of full-time skilled employees are rare in large Japanese
companies. 137 The typical methods of meeting structural changes include retrain-
ing and transfer of skilled workers from one production line to another, one plant
to another, and from production lines to service support staff positions. Reduc-
tions in overtime, increases in the number of holidays, and limited annual wage
increases are also employed. 3 The managements of unrelated companies even
arrange intercompany transfers of skilled workers to avoid dismissals.1
39
This system of private labor adjustment is based on and made possible by a
labor force divided into two groups: lifetime, unionized, skilled employees, and
non-unionized temporary workers.14° The existence of both types of workers
136. Cooperative adjustment has not always been a feature of Japanese labor relations. In the
mid-1950s, labor-management negotiations were characterized by confrontation and hostility. During
that period, the number of work days lost per 10 employees was approximately the same as the
number lost in the United States and the United Kingdom during the 1970s. See Shimada, New
Challenges for Japanese Labor-Management Relations in the Era of Global Structural Change,
JAPAN LAB. BULL., July 1, 1983, at 5, 7 [hereinafter cited as New Challenges].
137. See Sato, Japanese Companies Are Curbing Production and Holding Down Hiring in the Face
of Slack Domestic Demand and Exports, AP-Dow Jones News Service, July 7, 1982.
138. See Worker Motivation-H, supra note 128, at 5, 6. In a typical adjustment scenario, a large
manufacturer of cars, large trucks, and heavy machinery might cope with a slump in car sales by
failing to renew the short-term (generally one month) contracts of temporary workers throughout the
company, transferring some permanent but redundant auto workers to another heavy-industry division
to handle tasks formerly performed by temporary workers, and retraining other permanent employees
to staff an expansion in heavy machinery. A number of companies have recently undertaken this type
of adjustment. See Sato, supra note 137 (describing how Mitibushi Electric Corporation moved 30
percent of its workers out of its main audio-production plant and placed them in factories producing
high-growth products such as computers); Hanami, Worker Motivation in Japan-I, JAPAN LAB.
BULL., Feb. 1, 1982, at 5, 8 [hereinafter cited as Worker Motivation-I]. (Describing how Asahi
Shinbun Co. shifted 570 of 890 employees at its main plant from production into editorial, sales, and
advertising positions as well as production positions at other plants. During the year prior to the
move, management and union representatives met 240 times to discuss methods of worker replace-
ment.); Lohr, How Japan Helps Industry, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1983, at D1, D26 (Describing how
Petrochemical producers were drawing up plans to reduce production, although they had not yet
determined exactly which plants to scrap or how many workers might be laid off. They intended to
avoid layoffs by transferring workers to other operations.).
139. See Kanabayashi, supra note 128, at 34.
140. Japan's Labor Ministry defines three classes of employees: "regular" employees are all those
excluding temporary and day laborers; "temporary" employees are those employed for a term of not
less than one month and not more than one year; "day laborers" are those employed for less than one
month. See, YEARBOOK OF JAPANESE LABOR STATISTICS (1982) (Japan Labor Ministry). In this note,
"temporary worker" is used to refer to the temporary workers and day laborers. "Regular" employ-
ees, commonly referred to as "permanent employees," typically enjoy lifetime employment, a
seniority-based wage scale, and extensive on the job training. Although temporary workers may be
repeatedly rehired and may perform the same tasks as permanent employees, they may not become
members of enterprise unions and they do not receive the same training or the same salary as
permanent workers. See Galeson & Odaka, supra note 129, at 619.
The origins of the lifetime employment system are disputed. Some ascribe it to anthropological
and cultural patterns peculiar to the Japanese. See New Challenges, supra note 136. Studies of labor
relations conducted in the past decade have attributed it variously to management attempts to deal
with labor shortages in the 1920s and worker desires for job security during the periods of labor
oversupply following World War II, see Galeson & Odaka, supra note 129, at 616, or to efforts by
468 MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES
enables corporations to dismiss temporary workers and retrain and transfer per-
manent employees to meet changing company needs.' 4' Through this system,
companies collectively satisfy demands for new skills throughout the economy. 1
42
Neither judicial nor statutory rules sustain the distinction between permanent
and temporary workers. 43 Rather, management, motivated by profit potential,
perpetuates the system through the guarantee of lifetime work for permanent
employees. 144 The security fostered by lifetime employment breeds a cooperative
attitude toward management among permanent workers and inhibits the develop-
ment of union organizations encompassing both permanent and temporary em-
ployees. 145
Permanent employees typically belong to company-wide "enterprise
unions."146 Relieved of the fear of job loss which may accompany the introduc-
some union leaders and the management of industries such as steel and shipbuilding to defuse the
confrontational, communist-dominated union organizations of the mid 1950s. See Shimada, Japan's
Industrial Competitiveness? The Human Factor, JAPAN LAB. BULL., May 1, 1982, at 5, 7 [hereinafter
cited as The Human Factor]. For an elaboration of the latter theory that minimizes management's role
and emphasizes the "spontaneous choice of the working masses" in the shift from "radical,"
"political" unionism to "economic," "enterprise unionism," see Shimada, Japan's Misunderstood
Labor-Management Relations, LOOK JAPAN, June 10, 1983, at 4, 5.
141. This is perhaps an oversimplified description of the actors involved in the adjustment process
of large enterprises. See supra note 129.
142. See New Challenges, supra note 136, at 5-6.
143. The most significant distinction between permanent and temporary employees is the low rate
of dismissal enjoyed by the former. And thus far, the Japanese Government has not enacted statutes
restricting an employer's right to undertake dismissal to achieve workforce reductions. There is no
legislatively mandated notice period, workers are not provided with time off to seek new employ-
ment, and consultation with unions or the government is generally not required. See Hanami, supra
note 130, at 183. Case law developed by the judiciary does require that employers have a "just cause"
for dismissal. However, this principle does not prohibit dismissals for efficiency purposes (the usual
rational for large scale dismissals). Furthermore, in Japan, the role of judicial legal norms is not given
much sway in industrial relations..See Worker Motivation-Il, supra note 128.
144. See H. SHIMADA, THE JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM 27 (Japan Inst. of Labor, Japanese
Industrial Relations Series No. 6, 1980).
145. See Shirai, A Theory of Enterprise Unionism, in CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
JAPAN 117, 135 (T. Shirai ed. 1983).
146. Although there are few craft and industrial unions in Japan, more than 90 percent of all
organized workers are members of enterprise unions. T. HANAMI, LABOR RELATIONS IN JAPAN
TODAY 88 (1979). Enterprise unions vary in size from single unit unions in small firms with only one
plant to unions of larger multiplant enterprises that have several local branches. Each enterprise union
bargains seperately with the management of its enterprise. Only employees of a particular enterprise
are qualified to be members of the enterprise union operating at that enterprise. Id. This contrasts
sharply with the "closed-shop" practice employed in other industrialized nations. Under closed-shop
agreements, once a union has been recognized and has negotiated an agreement with a company, the
company is bound to hire workers from that union only. Id. at 88-89.
Despite the predominance of enterprise unions in Japan, industrial unions do exist. With few
exceptions, however, they are federations of enterprise unions within a particular industry. Most
generally function as advisory bodies. Only about 20 percent of the federations make policy decisions
binding on their members. The overwhelming majority of these federations do not have the authority
to collectively bargain, conclude employment agreements, or call strikes. See id. at 90-93; Shirai,
supra note 145, at 117-43.
Most of Japan's industrial federations are associated with one of three national confederations:
Sohyo, a politically liberal organization made up of approximately 36 percent of organized labor;
Domei, a conservative organization with a membership of 17 percent of the organized workforce; and
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tion of labor-efficient technology and new product lines, permanent employees
generally are willing to devote themselves to any kind of work their company
requires. 147 The guarantee of continued employment removes much of the incen-
tive to negotiate the rigid, protective work rules favored by U.S. unions.
1 4 s
Unencumbered by such restrictive rules, Japanese union members can accept
new job assignments and transfers involving interindustry mobility 49 without
fear of reprisal from fellow union members who, in the absence of lifetime
employment, might view such occupational flexibility as a threat to union
strength.
The recruitment, training, and remuneration methods developed for permanent
employees enhance their flexibility and encourage loyalty to their employers,
thus facilitating the private adjustment process.5 0 Each year large firms seek out
new graduates from middle schools, high schools, colleges, and universities. In
contrast to western workers, these graduates do not seek employment in a partic-
ular type of job, but rather in a particular enterprise. 5' They immediately enter
training programs which may take several years to complete. These programs,
which employ job rotation as a primary training vehicle,5 2 are designed to ensure
that new recruits become multi-skilled employees. 53 This extensive training
requires substantial employer investment, but the flexibility and the positive
effect that it has on workers' attitudes toward their companies appear to be
adequate compensation for most large companies.' '
Through experience gained in a variety of jobs, workers become proficient at
learning new skills. The time and monetary resources required by job adjustment
are minimized. Ongoing transfers ensure that employees' skill flexibility con-
tinues to increase through their working lifetime. 15 In recognition of the value of
permanent workers, Japanese management has developed a remuneration system
Churitsunoren, created to facilitate organization among the industrial organizations not affiliated with
either of the other organizations. Notwithstanding the existence of these organizations, union power is
largely decentralized. Despite provisions in the constitutions of some national industrial federations
empowering them to regulate and control affiliated unions, federations rarely force any decisions on
their member enterprise unions. Id. at 92-93.
147. See Worker Motivation in Japan-I, supra note 138, at 6.
148. See Galeston & Odaka, supra note 121, at 622-24. See also J. HERSCHMEIRA & T. Yui, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE BUSINESS 287 (2d ed. 1981) (describing the willingness of permanent
workers in Japan to shift jobs); UAW in Ohio Spurns Ford Bid for Concessions, Wall St. J., June 28,
1982, at 2 (an account of the importance that U.S. unions place on work rules and restraints on job
transfers).
149. See Galeston & Odaka, supra note 129, at 622-24.
150. For a discussion of these and other methods by which company officials encourage loyalty,
see E. VOGEL, supra note 129, at 146-50.
151. See JAPAN INST. OF LABOR, WAGES AND HOURS OF WORK 13 (Japan Industrial Relations
Series No. 3, 1984).
152. For anecdotal descriptions of training through job rotation, see Koike, Internal Labor
Markets, in CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 29, 42-44 (T. Shirai ed. 1983).
153. See Shimada, New Challenges, supra note 136, at 6. The Japan Institute of Labor estimated
that this initial training period typically takes from a few years to ten years to complete. Id.
154. See T. ISHIKAWA, VOCATIONAL TRAINING 21-25 (Japan Inst. of Labor, Japanese Industrial
Relations Series No. 7, 1981).
155. See id.
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that emphasizes seniority rather than the particular job that a worker may hold.
5 6
This wage system naturally enhances worker loyalty. 57 Temporary workers, hired
for short fixed terms, do not enjoy the security of lifetime employment and the
accompanying benefits of a senority wage scale and continuious training.'58
Thus, they do not generally have the opportunity to develop the workplace
flexibility or loyalty of permanent employees. 5 9 Having made a significant in-
vestment in the training of their lifetime employees, a Japanese company will
strive, as far as is possible, to maintain its permanent workforce. Temporary
workers are the logical choice for dismissal during economic downturns. 6'
Temporary workers do not have the numerical strength to fight this system,'
6'
and permanent employees do not need the additional bargaining strength that
would be gained from solidarity with temporary workers. 62 Without the backing
of permanent employees, temporary workers lack the power to press strike
threats to further their own interests. Thus, management can, without reprisal
from employees, dismiss temporary workers as profits fall.
63
B. Lifetime Employment Tested: The 1973-1974 Oil Crisis
Through the early seventies, the dichotomized labor force and private labor
adjustment provided Japanese companies with adequate flexibility to meet chang-
156. See Shimada, supra note 136, at 16. Shimada notes that while age, length-of-service, and
education are major determinates of wage, it would be incorrect to say that wages are not related to
productivity. Pointing to the long term trend toward an increase in the proportion of job-based or skill-
based wage components, Shimada suggests that the close correlation of age, length-of-service, and
education to wages simply implies that skill levels and job ranking themselves relate closely to such
factors. See id.
157. For a discussion of the possible changes in the dominant systems of training and remunera-
tion, see T. AMAYA, HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRY (Japan Inst. of Labor, Japanese
Industrial Relations Series No. 10, 1983)
158. See Galeson & Odaka, supra note 129, at 619-20.
159. But cf T. HANAMI, supra note 146, at 35 (noting that in the latter half of the 1970s, temporary
workers were staying for extended periods of time with one enterprise, developing the desire to be
treated like permanent employees, and were sometimes promoted to permanent status).
160. See Shirai, supra note 145, at 135.
161. A 1985 study contracted by the U.S. Labor Department and the Japan Labor Ministry
estimates that in many large firms temporary workers ordinarily constitute less than 10 percent of the
workforce. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 129, at 73. In 1972, official statistics put the number of
temporary workers at 7.3 percent of all employees. Galeson & Odaka, supra note 129, at 619. It
should be noted that these figures reflect only the number of temporary workers employed directly by
large companies. They do not include employees of the small subcontracting firms who essentially
function as temporary workers for larger firms. See, supra note 129. It should also be noted that
several commentators suggest that official statistics often underestimate the ratio of temporary to
permanant employees. Galeson & Odaka, supra note 129 at 619. Furthermore, some industries make
substantially greater use than others of temporary laborers. Id.; see also JAPAN'S FLEXIBLE AP-
PROACH, supra note 129, at 75-76 (discussing the significant flexibility in employment adjustment
afforded to the shipbuilding and textile industries as a result of their heavy reliance on women
workers who generally attain only temporary status).
162. See Shirai, supra note 145, at 135, 141 (implying that it is the memory of the late 1950s strikes
staged in response to employee reductions that continues to motivate employers to avoid layoff of
permanent employees).
163. See M. SHINOHARA, STRUCURAL CHANGES IN JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 315-16
(1974); Cf Galeson & Odaka, supra note 129, at 619-20 (describing management's similar treatment
of temporary workers and the employees of companies to whom work is subcontracted).
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ing market demands and new technological innovations. In 1973-1974 however,
increases in world oil prices sparked a recession and rendered less competitive a
host of Japanese industries, production technologies, and products.164 The
emerging industrial power of developing countries with low labor costs and
demands for wage increases by Japanese workers in 1975 and 1976, further
exacerbated the immediate problems of the oil crisis.
165
Inflation and the need to alter business and production strategies to achieve
greater efficiency led to predictions that management would be forced to reex-
amine lifetime employment.J66 The management of large enterprises voiced dis-
satisfaction with the system. 167 They argued that it forced firms to bear an unfair
portion of the cost of economic adjustment by requiring them to retain idle
workers.168 Between late 1974 and early 1976 companies in the textile, petroleum
refining, shipbuilding, industrial machinery, heavy electric machinery, and non-
ferrous metal industries began announcing reductions of their permanent work-
forces. 169 In addition to seeking volunteers for early retirement, these companies
began to dismiss unionized employees.
1 70
C. Indirect Aid: Reinforcement of Private Labor Adjustment
In 1974, partially in response to the increasing dismissals of permanent em-
ployees, the Japanese Government enacted the Employment Insurance Law.' In
164. See T. UCHINO, JAPANS PosTwAR ECONOMY 217-18. See generally id. at 196-212 (detailing
the domestic effects of the oil crisis and world-wide inflation on the Japanese economy).
165. See Odds Against Big Wage Boosts, Yomiuri Shimbun, Mar. 7, 1975, at 5; Nakamura, The
Politics ofAppeasement, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 22, 1974, at 36 (describing the effect of the spring
1974 labor strikes and the consequent 30 percent wage increase).
166. See Nakamura, supra note 165, at 37.
167. See Shimada, supra note 140, at 28, 29 n.2.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Dismissals of Workers Are Growing in Textile Field, JAPAN ECON. J., Oct. 29,
1974, at 8; Lay-offs Dismissals and Other Belt Tightening Are Spreading, JAPAN ECON. J., Nov. 5,
1974, at 15; Employment Adjustment is Progressing Swiftly Along With Worsening Recession, JAPAN
ECON. J., Dec. 31, 1974, at 5; Average Wage Increase in Spring Pay Drive is 14%, JAPAN ECON. J,
May 20, 1975, at 1; Labor Market Seems Headed for Long-Range Slackening as Economic Growth
Slows, JAPAN ECON. J., Nov. 4, 1975, at 5; Nihon Keizai, Feb. 26, 1976, at 7, translated in
SUMMARIES OF SELECTED JAPANESE PRESS, Mar. 2, 1976, at 31 (U.S. Embassy Tokyo ed.); More
Enterprises Are Beginning to Resort to Personal Reduction, JAPAN ECON. J., Mar. 2, 1976, at 2.
170. See Hanami, supra note 146, at 170-71 (noting that not all early retirements are entirely
voluntary).
The retirement system employed by many large enterprises itself appears to be designed to ensure
some of the flexibility that is crucial to the lifetime employment system. Permanant employees
generally face mandatory retirement at age 55. Many retirees, in need of income and able to work,
seek reemployment with smaller firms. Some of these firms subcontract with the former employers of
their new, "elderly" workers. Retirees employed by these firms experience a substantial decline in
wages and are subject to job loss during periods when workforee reductions are necessary. See
Galenson & Odaka, supra note 129, at 621-22; Shimada, supra note 144, at 15-16. It should be
noted, however, that it is not clear how much longer this system will last. In 1979, the government
announced its intention to increase the retirement age for public employees from 55 to 60. Unions
immediately pushed for parity in private companies. See HiAv. Bus. SCHOOL, NIPPON STEEL
CORPORATION 11-18 (HBS Case Service No. 9-482-07 1981).
171. Employment Insurance Law, Law No. 116 of 1974, unamended version translated in [8-HB]
EHS L. BULL. SERIFS (1975) [hereinafter cited as Employment Insurance Law 1975]; Talk Between
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addition to providing monetary assistance to most unemployed workers,'72 the
law enabled the government to indirectly aid permanent employees who without
government intervention might have suffered permanent dismissal. 173 Drawing on
funds obtained entirely through employer contributions, the government subsi-
dized the wages of permanent workers whom management retained in support
positions, placed in retraining programs, or furloughed.1 4 Through this indirect
form of assistance, the government created a mechanism whereby the more
successful businesses underwrote the traditional means of adjustment for the less
successful and thus prevented the dissolution of the private adjustment system. 75
The 1977 Employment Stabilization Fund System (Stabilization Fund), amend-
ing the Employment Insurance Law, further reinforced the private system of labor
adjustment. 17 6 The Stabilization Fund pays half the wages of employees at large
enterprises who are furloughed but not dismissed. 177 If workers are placed in
retraining programs, the government provides half their wages and a stipend for
training costs. 71 The government also reimburses half the differential that large
enterprises pay to employees whom they transfer to lower-paying positions at
other enterprises. 179
Labor Ministry Employment Security Bureau Director General Endo and Yomiuri Shimbun Commen-
tator Keizo Okudo, Yomiuri Shimbun, Mar. 1, 1974, at 4, translated in DAILY SUMMARY OF JAP-
ANESE PRESS, Mar. 26, 1975, at 17 (U.S. Embassy Tokyo ed.) [hereinafter cited as Talk With
Employment Security Bureau Director]; Okabe, Present Unemployment May Become Very Serious,
JAPAN ECON. J., Feb. 25, 1975, at 1.
172. The Employment Insurance Law is the main source of unemployment benefits of all types. Its
purpose is to stabilize the livelihood of workers by granting subsistance benefits when they are out of
work, facilitate job seeking activities, prevent unemployment, increase employment opportunities,
improve the employment structure, develop and improve workers' capabilities, and promote their
welfare with a view to contributing to their continuing employment. JAPAN INST. OF LABOR, EM-
PLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY 20, 21 (Jap. Inst. of Labor, Japanese Industrial Relations
Series No. 10, 1982) [hereinafter cited as EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY]. The law's
coverage is not all encompassing, however. While all permanent employees qualify for assistance,
only in certain circumstances will temporary workers be afforded any assistance. Employment
Insurance Law, supra note 130, at arts. 3, 6, 42, 43.
173. Indirect aid is available under articles 62(4), 63(1), and 63(4) of the Employment Insurance
Law of 1975, Employment Insurance Law 1975, supra note 164. The law also contains direct aid
provisions, see, e.g., id. at arts. 6(3), (5). These direct aid measures, together with direct aid
measures enacted in later laws, are discussed infra notes 191-202.
174. See Employment Insurance Law 1975, supra note 171, at arts. 62(4), 63(4); Employment and
Employment Policy, supra note 172, at 23-24; Hanami, supra note 130, at 168-69.
175. See Talk With Employment Security Bureau Director, supra note 171 at 18; GAO REPORT,
supra note 7, at 80.
176. Law No. 43 of May 20, 1977, art. 61-2(I) (amending article 55 of the Employment Insurance
Law, supra note 130); see Employment and Employment Policy, supra note 172, at 23-24.
177. EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 172, at 23. The government subsidizes
two-thirds of the wages of employees of small- and mid-sized firms. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. Transfer subsidies are determined in advance according to the type of industry and the
period of subsidization. Id. The General Accounting Office (GAO) provides a slightly different
description of the Employment Stabilization Fund. Like the Japanese Labor Institute in Employment
and Employment Policy, id., it indicates that wage subsidization for workers in retraining is available
to all employers. GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 81. According to the GAO, however, payment to
employers of the wage differential of the employees who are laid off and rehired at (or transferred to)
lower paying jobs, is limited to workers in government designated industries. Id. at 81-82. According
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In 1975, the Director General of the Labor Ministry Employment Security
Bureau attributed the stabilization of unemployment that began in December
1974 to government subsidization of employer adjustment measures. 80 Available
figures support this assessment. The United States General Accounting Office
(GAO) estimates that between April 1, 1975 and March 31, 1976, the wages of
2.85 million workers in 5,948 companies in 152 industries were subsidized by
funds distributed to employers.' 8' The GAO found that the indirect aid measures
of the employment law saved approximately 200,000 to 300,000 jobs in 1975
alone. 12 It also found that the Stabilization Fund, in its first six months of
operation, provided 4.2 million subsidized days of training to permanent
workers. 8 I
More telling than the impact of these indirect aid methods on employment
figures is the renewed acceptance of the lifetime employment system that they
stimulated among private-sector managers. Underemployment among permanent
employees is now accepted and sustained by most large companies as a "welfare
responsibility of Japanese corporations. " 18 A recession at the beginning of the
current decade once again increased the difficulties of negotiating private adjust-
ment through intra- and inter-company transfers.18 Yet the management of large
companies did not call for an end to the lifetime employment system as they did
in 1975. Rather, with indirect assistance from the government, management
sought creative ways to avoid dismissals of their permanent workers. 
18 6
Indirect aid helped arrest a trend that might otherwise have destroyed the
distinction between permanent and temporary workers,187 and with it the flexibil-
ity needed for management-union directed adjustment of the labor force to be
successful.18  Had permanent workers been stripped of the certainty of lifetime
employment, they might have resorted to the organizational practices and self-
protective demands of workers in other countries. They would likely have been
to the report, employers in government-designated industries are also eligible for additional long-term
assistance in the form of wage subsidization during periods of retooling or retraining for the purpose
of switching product lines. Id. at 81-82.
According to either description, the Employment Stabilization Fund System is primarily an indi-
rect aid method in that it distributes funds to employers who, in turn, use the money to maintain their
permanent workforce. It should be noted, however, that, at least according to the GAO description,
the system has some of the flavor of direct aid in that it provides the government with the power to
designate certain industries as eligible for extended assistance.
180. See Talk With Employment Security Bureau Director, supra note 171, at 18.
181. GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 81.
182. Id. Less conservative than the GAO, the Japanese Labor Institute estimated that the subsidy
saved approximately 300,000 workers from unemployment during 1975. H. SHIMADA, supra note
144, at 17.
183. GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 81.
184. See Lohr, supra note 138, at 41.
185. Kanbayashi, supra note 128, at 34.
186. See id. Kanbayashi states that a company must be part of a designated depressed industry in
order to receive retraining assistance. But according to the Japanese Labor Institute and the GAO,
retraining assistance is available to all companies in all industries. See supra note 179.
187. See Talk With Employment Bureau Director, supra note 171, at 5 (Without the government
created wage subsidy or "lay-off allowance.... there would probably have appeared a considerable
number of enterprises, which rushed into personnel curtailment beyond a lay-off." Id.).
188. See text accompanying notes 135-63.
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drawn to a more traditional union structure that would have included both perma-
nent and temporary employees. The enterprise loyalty of unionized employees,
which facilitated adjustment, would perhaps have been replaced by interfirm
worker solidarity. Thus, temporary workers would likely have become part of the
organized labor force and in so doing have empowered themselves to fight em-
ployment loss during slack periods.
189
Management for its part would probably have rejected the currently accepted
belief that underemployment of permanent workers is a welfare aspect of Jap-
anese corporations and government policy makers thus might have been forced to
intervene explicitly, possibly to direct adjustment in all cases of workforce reduc-
tions.190 In short, the cooperative attitude of management and organized labor
and the weakness of temporary workers, which facilitated the efficient adjust-
ment of the country's skilled labor force without significant government responsi-
bility for change, might have been destroyed.
D. Direct Aid: The Government's Inability To Guide Labor Adjustment
Measures supporting private adjustment were not the only legislative response
to rising unemployment among permanent workers in the 1970s. In addition to
certain limited direct aid measures in the Employment Insurance Law,191 the
Japanese Government enacted an important direct aid provision-the "employ-
189. A recent analysis of the effects of the microelectronics revolution of the mid-1980s on the
lifetime employment system and labor management relations supports this analysis. See New Tech-
nology in Japan Challenges Tradition, WORLD OF WORK REPORT 2 (July 1984). The specialized skills
required in microelectronic production demand outside experts and younger staff for whom new,
highly technical skills are more accessible. These individuals often assume positions of seniority that
would normally go to older permanent employees. Furthermore, information about new computer
data storage often requires high security measures which conflict with the traditional policy of open
communication between management and workers and limits worker skill flexibility and exposure to
the entire production process. According to Takao Nuki, Professor at Musashi University, Tokyo, and
author of the microelectronics analysis, the resulting decline in permanant employees has eroded the
group spirit that supports the enterprise union system, and reliance on outside personnel has weak-
ened the strength of enterprise unions. Id. at 3. He suggests that a new kind of union which can meet
the needs of newly mobile workers may need to be formed. Id. It is likely that such a union would
necessarily be industry-wide and include temporary workers.
190. In most industrialized countries, except the United States, government involvement in work-
force adjustment is legislatively mandated whether or not government assistance is sought. The
involvement required by such legislation varies. In Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany (West
Germany), the United Kingdom, and Italy, management must provide government officials with prior
notification of all dismissals and follow legislatively determined negotiating procedures. Yemin,
Introduction, in WORKFORCE REDUCTIONS IN UNDERTAKINGS 1, 12 (E. Yemin ed. 1982). In France,
Portugal, the Netherlands, and Spain, explicit authorization by government officials is required before
individual or mass dismissals can be carried out. These governments often effectively become the
bargaining representatives of the workers whom management would like to dismiss. Id. at 13.
Although an exploration of the correlation between the inability of organized labor and managment to
reach a private consensus over how redundancies are to be carried out and government direction of
adjustment is beyond the scope of this note, it seems likely that there is a positive relationship
between government decisions to take an increasingly active role in workforce reductions and lack of
consensus among private parties as to how the issue should be handled.
191. Supra note 172.
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ment shift system"-in the Employment Countermeasures Law. 192 The shift
system theoretically placed control over the matching of labor resources and
production demands in the hands of the government.193 Funds for the program
were drawn from general government revenues rather than from employer contri-
butions, 194 and, in contrast to indirect aid methods, employers and unions did not
plan and control the adjustment process.
This direct aid law was similar to the government-initiated, industry-wide
assistance program advocated by expansionists in the United States. 195 The Jap-
anese Government was effectively responsible for initiating the adjustment pro-
cess since only workers in government-designated industries could receive direct
aid. 196 The government certified workers on an industry-wide basis'97 and chose
the industries to be assisted without reference to statutory criteria such as import
injury. 198 These aspects of the law, along with the power it provided government
officials to withhold benefits until certified workers complied with relocation and
192. GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 79. The Countermeasures Law is variously referred to as the
Temporary Relief Law for Workers Displaced From Specific Depressed Industries, EMPLOYMENT
AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 172, at 24, the Employees in Structural Depressed Industries
Law, Comment, supra note 134, at 604; and Law No. 95 Concerning Temporary Measures for
Workers Displaced from Specific Depressed Industries, T. HANAMI, supra note 146, at 169. In this
note, subsequent citations are to the Law Concerning Temporary Measures for Workers Displaced
from Specified Depressed Industries, as amended by Law No. 40 of May 8, 1978, Law No. 107 of
Nov. 18, 1978 and Law No. 64 of Dec. 18, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Temporary Measures Law],
translation provided by Akimichi Mikami, Chief Second Employment Trend Analysis Section, Em-
ployment Policy Division, Employment Security Bureau, the Ministry of Labour (copy on file,
Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies). This translation is, however, missing one page
covering articles 10, 11, 12, and part of 13. Those texts, unofficially translated by Oke K. Chun, are
hereinafter cited as Temporary Measures (Chun) (copy on file, Michigan Yearbook of International
Legal Studies).
Just as the Employment Insurance Law is not a pure manifestation of the indirect aid concept, see
supra note 132, neither was the Countermeasures Law based solely on the direct aid ideal. In Chapter
11, Prevention of Unemployment, it incorporates some of the indirect aid measures of the Employ-
ment Insurance Law itself. Temporary Measures Law, supra note 192, at art. 5.
193. See, e.g., Temporary Measures Law, supra note 192, at arts. 6, 7(3), 7(4), 8, 9; Temporary
Measures (Chun), supra note 192, at arts. 10(D), (E), (F), Ii(B), (C); see also GAO REPORT, supra
note 7, at 79.
194. Temporary Measures Law, supra note 192, at art. 15; GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 79.
195. See supra, notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
196. See Temporary Measures Law, supra note 192, at arts. 1, 2; GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at
79.
197. Temporary Measures Law, supra note 192, at arts. 1, 2.
198. Id. at art. 2. The article defines a "specified depressed industry" as
an industry in which economic conditions such as changes in the basic economic environ-
ment, depression over a protracted period, etc., have caused a conspicuous surplus in its
capacity of supplying [sic] products or services and such a situation is likely to continue over a
long period of time and because of this curtailment of the scale of business or business
activities, or change or abolition of business ... has been carried out in conformity with an
action based on legislation or with State measures, with the result that a considerably large
number of displaced workers have appeared or are likely to appear, and which is designated by
Cabinet Order as one in need of special measures prescribed by this Law in respect of the said
displaced workers.
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retraining requirements, 99 should have enabled the government to coordinate and
direct employment growth and contraction in various industries. E°°
It appears, however, that the shift system was not used to move workers into
growth industries. Government officials found it difficult to decide how to trans-
fer workers from one industry to another.20 In some instances jobs for the
eligible unemployed were so scarce that the Minister of Labor waived the provi-
sion requiring workers to participate in retraining or relocation programs prior to
receipt of cash benefits. Instead, he authorized the extension of benefits for
specified periods. 0 2 Waiver of this portion of the law significantly decreased the
ability of the government to redirect underutilized labor resources.
Although some argue that direct aid was responsible for successful worker
adjustment assistance,2 3 it appears to have functioned largely as a source of
unemployment benefits, not a tool that enabled the government to move labor
into growth industries. 204 Having abandoned the coercive measure of the employ-
ment shift mechanism, the government could not have been the guiding force
behind the relocation of workers from one industry to another. Thus, worker
adjustment in Japan appears to have been the result of government encourage-
ment of private adjustment methods between employers and enterprise unions.
By providing a mechanism for redistributing resources from profitable companies
to those in need of funds to carry out management-labor directed retraining, the
Japanese Government facilitated the development of new worker skills without
interfering in the adjustment process of the private labor market.
III. EVALUATING U.S. ALTERNATIVES: LESSONS OF THE JAPANESE
EXPERIENCE
Innovation and flexibility at the company or plant level appears to be have been
the key to successful labor adjustment in Japan. In the wake of the 1973-1974 oil
crisis, government financial aid that encouraged the lifetime employment system
and cooperative private adjustment proved more useful than nationwide govern-
ment-coordinated worker retraining and relocation. The ineffectiveness of the
Japanese direct aid provisions argues against expansionist proposals requiring
similar government initiative and government planning in the United States. Such
programs may supplant private initiatives while themselves deteriorating into
simple unemployment compensation. Yet, Japanese management's desire in 1974
for mass dismissals of permanent employees suggests, contrary to the hypothesis
199. Temporary Measures (Chun), supra note 192, at arts. I0(D)(3), II(C); GAO REPORT, supra
note 7, at 79.
200. See Comment, supra note 192, at 607 (arguing that the legislation, by tying benefits to worker
participation, allows the government to offer "positive incentives in order to shift human resources
into competitive areas of the economy").
201. Discussion between Akimichi Mikami, Chief, Second Employment Tiend Analysis Section,
Employment Policy Division, Employment Security Bureau, Ministry of Labor and John Hitchcock,
AP-Dow Jones News Service, Feb. 4, 1986 [hereinafter cited as Discussion with Mikami] (notes on
file, Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies).
202. Id.; GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 79.
203. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 134.
204. Discussion with Mikami, supra note 201.
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of the Reagan Administration, that financial assistance from the federal govern-
ment may be necessary to encourage private adjustment methods.
How, then, should assistance be administered? The differences between Jap-
anese and U.S. labor-management relations and union structures caution against
a program designed to encourage U.S. companies to emulate the specific adjust-
ment methods employed by Japanese management and labor.205 Furthermore, the
opposition of U.S. labor organizations to trade liberalization 2°6 will, in all like-
205. The adjustment methods generally used by large Japanese enterprises are designed for a labor
pool of temporary and permanent employees operating in a non-adversarial labor relations system
dominated by plant-based enterprise units. See supra text accompanying notes 135-63. None of these
qualities characterize U.S. labor-management relations. Although over 80 percent of the U.S. labor
force is not unionized, L. TROY & N. SHELFLIN, UNION SOURCE BOOK 1-1 (Industrial Relations Data
Information Service, 1985), the effect within the United States' major manufacturing sectors does not
resemble the permanent-temporary worker dichotomy of Japan. Workers in the United States' major
manufacturing industries tend to be unionized, and even in the instances in which unorganized
laborers work alongside union members, nonunion workers are ensured virtually the same treatment
as their unionized counterparts. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 374-98 (1976). Thus, there is little opportunity for management to foster
a special class of less privileged employees who, like temporary workers in Japan, would cushion
other workers from job loss during slow economic periods. It should be noted, however, that the
seniority system used by most U.S. unions can arguably be viewed as a de facto form of lifetime
employment. See HARV. Bus. SCHOOL, REFLECTIONS ON JAPANESE FACTORY MANAGEMENT II
(HBS Case Services No. 9-681-084, Apr. 1983).
Although the adversarial nature of a labor-management relationship is difficult to quantify, one
computation, using figures supplied by the Prime Minister's Office and the Labor Minister's Office in
Japan and the Department of Labor in the United States, divided the average number of work days lost
through strikes in 1978-1980 by the number of employed persons in 1978 to find that .028 work days
were lost in Japan per person while .390 were lost in the United States. JAPAN INST. OF LABOR,
LABOR UNIONS AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 34 (Japan Inst. of Labor, Japan Indusrial
Relations Series No. 2, 1983). In the relatively non-adversarial setting of Japan, adjustment provi-
sions can be and generally are designed to preserve the position of permanent employees. See supra
notes 135-39, and accompanying text. The management and unions of individual enterprises orally
agree upon such adjustment measures as the need arises. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 129, at 81.
The more adversarial character of labor-management relations in the United States, the relatively
rigid rules and job classifications on which the power of industrial unionism is based, and the fact that
union strength more often lies with international organizations than with their local membership, see
J. FossuM, LABOR RELATIONS 92-93 (1979), creates an atmosphere which is less than conducive to
the spontaneous development of the private adjustment procedures used in Japan.
206. Without special compensation for workers affected by imports, it is doubtful that the 1974
Trade Act would have been enacted. Although many of the major labor unions endorsed liberalizing
trade legislation in the early 1960s, C. FRANK, supra note 2, at 4-5, by 1965, some of the most
powerful were advocating strong protectionist measures. Id. In the late 1960s, the AFL-CIO helped
draft what would become the 1971 Burke-Hartke Bill-legislation intended to reduce imports through
the imposition of mandatory quotas. See Ross, Labor's Big Push for Protectionism, FORTUNE, March
1973, at 92, 93. In 1973, organized labor refused to endorse the Trade Act of 1974, believing that it
would not reconcile the advantages and disadvantages of liberalized trade. Fiscal Year 1984 Autho-
rizations for Customs Service, International Trade Commission, and the U.S. Trade Representative;
Recomendations for March 15 Report to the Budget Committee, Subcomm. on Trade of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (statement of John H. Sheehan, Legislative
Director, United Steelworkers of America). Instead of free trade, the labor movement favored market
shares and greater assurances of protection for U.S. industry and U.S. workers. Id. Labor appears to
have acquiesced to the liberalizing measures of the 1974 Trade Act only on the presumption that
adjustment assistance-compensation beyond existing unemployment measures-would be available
to affected workers. See id. at 102-05; Oversight of Trade Adjustment Assistance, Programs And
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lihood, result in the continued recognition that a special injury is sustained by
workers who suffer job loss as a result of international trade.
201
Nevertheless, the respective success and failure of the Japanese indirect and
direct aid programs provide a useful backdrop against which to evaluate U.S.
proposals for change. Assuming that an element of compensation for import
injury must be included in any U.S. adjustment program, this section compares
Japanese methods of worker adjustment to the methods of TAA and the methods
contained in the proposed replacements for TAA. It argues that the certification
requirements and investigation procedures of TAA provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for Japanese-like innovation and flexibility among workers and manage-
ment. It' suggests, however, that TAA's distribution methods, as well as the
distribution methods proposed by the expansionists and the Administration, are
ineffective because they do not give workers and plant level management a voice
in the development of adjustment programs.
Part III concludes with a proposal for a two-pronged program of government
assistance that should encourage the worker-management cooperation that has
proved crucial to continuous worker adjustment in Japan. The compensation and
free market principles would continue to drive this program. However, rather
than creating a compromise between the two principles, as does the current TAA,
or nearly eliminating one or both, as suggested by the Reagan Administration and
the expanstionists respectively, the system proposed here would create separate
measures to implement each principle. The first prong, embodying the compen-
sation principle, would employ the certification methods of TAA but would
distribute cash benefits only. The second would consist of a tax incentive system
for employer retraining to encourage private (free market) adjustment, without
reference to import competition.
A. Certification
The certification procedures of TAA, limiting investigations to the plant level
and certification itself to single plants or plant divisions, are largely a reflection
Authorization of Appropriations for the U.S. Trade Representative, International Trade Commission,
and Customs Service: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. 218-19 (1983) (statement of Stephan Koplan, Legislative Representative, AFL-
CIO).
207. This argument is often used by economists, politicians, and political commentators in defense
of TAA, see, e.g., Aho, Comment, in IMPORT COMPETITION AND RESPONSE 358 (J. Bhagwati ed.
1982); Oversight of Trade Adjustment Assistance and Authorization of Appropriations for U.S. Trade
Representative, International Trade Representative, International Trade Commission, and Customs
Service: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 223 (1983) (statement of Sen. Heinz); Fiscal Year 1984 Authorizations for Customs
Service, International Trade Commission, and the U.S. TRade Representative; Recomendations for
March 15 Report to the Budget Committee, Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1983) (statement of Cong. Page); Birenbaum & Moser, Trade
Adjustment Assistance: Vital Program in a Recession Year, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1980, at 19. While
there are those who refute this argument, see, e.g., Wolf, Comment, in IMPACT COMPETITION AND
RESPONSE 364 (J. Bhagwati ed. 1982) (questioning the effectiveness of TAA as a political "bribe" id.
at 366.), relief for import-injured workers has historically appeared to be a less protectionist alter-
native to the quota restrictions and duty increases for which the U.S. labor movement has lobbied
over the last 20 years. See C. FRANK, supra note 2, at 5.
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of the compensation principle. 28 Expansionist proposals would replace the cur-
rent worker-initiated, plant-by-plant system with a government-initiated, indus-
try-wide certification process. 20 9 The Japanese adjustment experience and the
nature of labor-management relations in the United States suggest that such a
change would likely hinder rather than encourage worker adjustment.
In the post-oil crisis period, successful adjustment in Japan resulted from
management and union-negotiated retraining aimed at matching worker skills to
new production methods. Over the last two decades, a similar trend of joint labor-
management directed adjustment has begun to emerge in union contracts in the
United States.21 0 The generally adversarial character of U.S. labor-management
relations makes it likely, however, that implementation of the government-initi-
208. See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
210. This trend can be seen in the increasing number of contracts containing technological change,
plant closing, and retraining provisions. In 1966, the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) surveyed a
sample of 300 manufacturing industry contracts and found that 13 percent contained technological
change clauses. Somewhat less than half of these required prior discussion with the union and only a
handful required employee training. See BUREAU NAT'L AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CON-
TRACTS 65:4 (1966). In 1983, the BNA found that 20 percent of the sample 300 agreements contained
such clauses. Id. at 65 (1983). In a 1981 review of 522 major contracts, each covering over 1,000
workers, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) found that 36 percent placed restrictions on plant
relocation-an increase over the 22 percent of the contracts examined in 1966. Unions Taking Bigger
Role in Plant Closing, Relocation, According to BLS Review of Contracts, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA),
at A-2 (Aug. 27, 1981).
For a detailed account of the technological changes and plant closing provisions contained in 100
pattem-setting contracts in a variety of industries, see INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO,
COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF MAJOR BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 162-78 (Nov. 1984).
For a fairly pessimistic evaluation of the usefulness of current technological change provisions, see
K. MURPHY, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE CLAUSES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 28-29
(Dep't for Professional Employees, AFL-CIO Aug. 1981).
In recent years a number of major labor agreements have included worker retraining provisions.
The Ford-UAW training and development program, perhaps the best known joint labor-management
program for worker adjustment, provided the prototype for other agreements. The plan was part of the
"detailed partnership approach": adopted by the parties in their 1982 contract. Ford-UAW Training
Program Seen as Model Private Sector Plan, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at C-I (Feb. 2, 1983).
Commonly known as the "nickel fund," it provides up to $5,000 per worker for retraining. See
Serrin, The 'Nickel Fund': A Prototype Program for Retraining Jobless Workers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2,
1985, at 17. Workers and management at the plant level attempt to determine future job prospects and
approach local chambers of commerce and school boards about developing related training programs.
Training and Job Placement Highlight Gains Under Auto Job Security Pacts, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), at A-4, A-6 (June 1, 1983). A similar program has been created by the UAW and General
Motors. Id. For descriptions of other negotiated retraining programs, see Unemployed Longshoremen
in New York to Get Special Dockside Treatment, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A-5 (Jan. 12, 1982)
(agreement between employers in New York and the International Longshoreman's Association);
Savoie, Current Developments and Future Agenda in Union-Management Cooperation in Training
and Retraining of Workers, 1985 INDUS. REL. RESEARCH A. 535, 536-37 (agreement between the
Communications Workers of America, AT&T, and other communications companies); id. at 538
(steel industry agreement pledging the parties to jointly pursue government funds for retraining).
Managerial interest in avoiding layoffs can also be seen in increased reliance on work sharing and
temporary contract workers among non-unionized companies. See How Motorola Avoids Layoffs,
WORLD OF WORK REPORT, Sept. 1984, at 2. In contrast to the measures included in collectively
bargained contracts, the practices of such companies more closely parallel the adjustment methods
employed by Japanese companies. For an argument as to why these specific practices may often be of
little use in the United States, see supra note 205.
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ated investigation methods and industry-wide certification procedures suggested
by the expansionists would encourage employers and unions who have negotiated
or are thinking about negotiating such an agreement, to abdicate all retraining
responsibility to government policy makers."'
Government-initiated industry-wide investigations and certifications might
also inhibit adjustment by reducing incentives for labor, management, and cred-
itors to restructure weak firms. Workers in certified industries, aware that the
government had decided to support and retrain them, would likely be less recep-
tive to the real and symbolic sacrifices required by the pay cuts and changes in
work rules or production methods that management would likely view as vital to
restoring the health of a firm hurt by imports. 212 Faced with labor resistance to
concessions, creditors and management would be more inclined to abandon their
investment rather than look for creative ways to restructure.1 3 In contrast, main-
tenance of worker or union initiation of the certification process would provide
211. J. David Richardson's discussion of the effect of TAA on workers and management supports,
by analogy, this analysis. Richardson, Trade Adjustment Under the Trade Act of 1974: An Analytical
Examination and Worker Survey, in IMPORT CoMPETrrION AND RESPONSE 321, 330, 353 n. 16 (J.
Bhagwati ed. 1982). According to Richardson, the "generous benefit" terms TAA may have in-
creased, rather than decreased, unemployment. Under TAA, a worker, once certified, is automatically
eligible for assistance for two years. Thus, a worker who is laid off, certified, and subsequently
rehired by the same company will automatically receive benefits if he or she is laid off again within
two years of the first certification. Richardson suggests that once a group of workers had been
certified, employers become more willing to lay them off and workers themselves become less
resistant to job loss. See id. at 321, 330, 353 n. 16. Similarly, once workers are certified for assistance,
management may lose any inhibitions it has regarding layoffs and workers may find it easier to accept
assistance-in whatever form available-than to organize themselves to force managment to work
with them to develop retraining programs to circumvent layoffs.
212. Despite the developing trend in favor of cooperative labor-management solutions to adjust-
ment problems, worker approval of such methods is at best tenuous. For example, in 1982, following
the conclusion of agreements with the UAW that included cost-saving and union give-backs, Ford and
General Motors successfully negotiated a number of plant level changes in work rules, seniority,
overtime, and shift preferences. Ford and General Motors argued that if workers did not help reduce
costs through such methods, the companies would be forced to subcontract with outside concerns for
the production of parts for future models. Ford also suggested that it might be forced to construct new
production facilities in Mexico. However, despite the implied threats, and even without the assurance
of government assistance in the case of layoffs, not all union members accepted the proposed change.
One president of a UAW local said that his membership rejected Ford's proposal because it believed
that the company's national agreement with the union contained enough sacrifices. UAW in Ohio
Spurns Bid for Concessions, Wall St. J., June 28, 1982 at 8. He said that the requested concessions
were "minor. But the principle involved in not giving up any more is much more important." Id.
213. Although no one has done any empirical studies testing the strength of this hypothesis, the
argument has an intuitive appeal born out by anecdotal accounts. When, for instance, the Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corporation filed for reorganization under Chapter II of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code, management blamed the United Steelworkers for the failure of creditor negotiations aimed at
restructuring the company. The union was willing to give up $200 million in wages and benefits in
exchange for preferred stock. Seeking a similar sacrifice from the company's creditors, the union
requested that in exchange for equity in the company, the lenders defer and forgive interest and
principle payments for two years. The creditors agreed to the deferrals, but refused to convert any of
the company's debt to equity. Subsequently, negotiations collapsed. The company insisted that it had
worked out an accord with its creditors that would have prevented bankruptcy, but that the union
refused to participate. Cuff, Chapter 11 Petition Filed by Wheeling, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1985, at D1,
D5.
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labor and management with the opportunity to bargain for and undertake grad-
ual, company-sponsored, contract-specific adjustment.
Mandatory worker initiation of the certification procedure, the plant-by-plant
method of government investigation, and the plant or plant-division limitation on
certification, also provide some assurance that workers have an opportunity to
negotiate adjustment provisions specific to their needs. In Japan, the strength of
enterprise unions ensures that the interests of workers at individual plants are not
subordinated to the political goals of national unions.21 4 In the United States,
however, bargaining practices often subordinate local concerns to the interests of
national unions. Bargaining between broad-based industrial unions and corporate
management or management associations and the practice of bargaining paceset-
ting contracts for industry-wide application are common.2"5 Without the plant-by-
plant limitation on investigations and certifications, workers sharing concerns
and insights unique to their plant or company might find their interest in seeking,
avoiding, or shaping government assistance overshadowed by the goals of na-
tional unions. Although a national union may initiate the application process on
behalf of workers at a number of enterprises, the plant-by-plant limit on investi-
gations and the plant or plant-division limit on certification focus government
inquiry on the situation and interests of workers at individual plants.
Finally, worker initiation of the certification process also somewhat limits the
degree to which TAA can be exploited to serve the political proclivities of a
particular presidential administration. 216 If the process were to begin only at the
initiation of the government, an administration hostile to the concept of adjust-
ment assistance could effectively eliminate the program through disuse. Further-
more, a politically motivated administration might be overly sensitive to workers
in industries that have lobbying clout or workers in key congressional districts,
and less inclined to meet the adjustment needs of the constituents of political
opponents. The current statutory obligation of the Labor Department to investi-
gate all properly filed worker petitions,2 17 together with workers' right to judicial
review of the Department's investigative methods, 21t limits the potential for such
abuse.
214. Galeson & Odaka, supra note 129, at 243-35.
215. See id. at 243. For a descriptive example of bargaining in the United States, see Moderating
Wage Settlements Seen in 1982's Major Contract Talks, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A-8 to A-9 (Nov.
20, 1981).
216. The ability of an administration to shape even the current adjustment assistance program
according to its political views can be seen by comparing the number of workers certified during the
year preceding and the year following President Reagan's election. In 1980 the Department of Labor
denied 62 percent of the 3,213 petitions investigated. In 1981 the denial rate rose to 84 percent of the
2,626 petitions investigated. Through June 1982 the denial rate was approximately 81 percent.
Department investigators interviewed in 1982 said that borderline cases that would have been certified
before 1981 were denied after the election of President Reagan. They explained that the change in
practice was a reflection of a new atmosphere brought about by the Reagan Administration and made
possible by the flexibility of the certification requirements. See CERTIFICATION PRocEss, supra note
42, at 7.
217. 19 U.S.C. § 2273(a) (1982).
218. 19 U.S.C. § 2395 (1982).
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B. Distribution
In their focus on current job openings rather than skills which are likely to be
in demand in the future, the guidelines governing the distribution of TAA benefits
reflect the free market principle. 219 Thus far, however, their effect has not been
favorably evaluated. Both the Reagan Administration and the expansionists have
suggestions for improving distribution procedures: the Administration would
incorporate trade adjustment assistance into state-run manpower training pro-
grams and provide a tax incentive to encourage the establishment of individual,
voluntary, joint worker-company savings accounts (ITAs) to finance post-
dismissal retraining;220 the expansionists would decrease market restraints on
state employment insurance officials or move coordination of adjustment to the
federal level. 22" ' Although these mechanisms may prove more effective than the
current procedures, none reflect the most basic lesson of the Japanese experi-
ence-that the flexibility and innovation necessary to continuous worker adjust-
ment can best be achieved through a significant degree of management and
worker involvement in the design of retraining programs.
While the savings promoted by ITAs may cushion the effects of dismissal for
some workers, 2 2 they will not encourage the cooperative spirit driving worker
adjustment in Japan. The concept's post-job loss, individual orientation will not
only not encourage labor-management initiatives for continuous adjustment, it
will discourage them. The ITA concept prohibits the use of employer-employee
savings to finance on-the-job retraining to meet changing company needs. 2 3
Thus, if a company that has deposited funds in an ITA decides to retool to meet
new market demands or accomodate production innovations, it will be unable to
tap its ITA funds to retrain current employees. Companies foreseeing this
posibility will either be discouraged from updating their plant and production
methods, or, despite the tax incentive, decline to invest in ITAs for their
employees.
Theoretically, the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), designed to foster
greater private sector involvement in job training,2 24 should promote the local-
level participation that has been critical to Japanese adjustment. There are, how-
ever, several reasons why the Administration's proposed use of the JTPA is likely
to result in even less retraining than takes place under the current state-admin-
istered distribution system.
Under President Reagan's proposal, officials of state employment insurance
offices would be absolved of their current responsibility for determining labor
market needs and creating or evaluating the appropriateness of retraining pro-
grams for skilled labor. They would no longer be required to assess the state-wide
employment situation to determine whether workers should be required to relo-
cate and accept a specified type of training or forfeit their readjustment allow-
219. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 99-127 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 109-73 and accompanying text.
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ances. 2 5 Instead, distribution activities would be left to the Private Industry
Councils (PICs) formed under the JTPA. Although oversight of worker retraining
by the PICs would increase local, private involvement in the development of
retraining programs, it would fail to give workers an adaquate voice in the design
of the adjustment process.
Insofar as the Administration's proposed use of PICs shifts retraining decisions
from state officials to a board composed largely of local, private sector represen-
tatives, it does move U.S. adjustment assistance in the direction of Japanese
indirect aid. And, unlike the proposals for national tripartite planning, 226 it avoids
the centralized adjustment guidance found to be ineffective in Japan. A closer
examination of the membership of the PICs reveals, however, that "local private-
sector" representation does not necessarily translate into labor-management
decisions.
The majority of the representatives on each PIC are owners of businesses or
private sector executives. 2 7 The remaining positions are held by representatives
of educational agencies, organized labor, rehabilitation agencies, community-
based organizations, economic development agencies, and public employment
service offices. 228 The chair of each council must be selected from among the
representatives of the private sector.2 29 Organized labor thus has only a limited
voice in the creation and approval of public and private retraining programs.
Furthermore, there is no provision for the representation of non-unionized labor
on the PICs. Thus, workers at non-unionized plants have no opportunity to
ensure that their concerns are considered in retraining decisions.
230
A second reason why the JTPA is likely to fail to stimulate retraining is that it
does not provide income maintenance. The Japanese experience suggests that
innovation and flexibility in company-sponsored worker retraining programs de-
creases without some public financial assistance. Furthermore, in the United
States, there is evidence that without some income subsidy, displaced workers
who are heads of households find it difficult to take advantage of retraining
programs. 231 Under TAA, workers in training can receive up to 26 weeks of cash
benefits beyond the basic income maintenance period. 232 Proponents of the Rea-
225. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
227. 29 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1) (1982).
228. 29 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2) (1982).
229. 29 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (1982).
230. It should be remembered, however, that in Japan temporary workers similarly have no voice
in retraining decisions. See supra notes 158-68 and accompanying text. For further criticism of the
private industry council concept, see Industrial Policy: The Retraining Needs of the Nation's Long
Term Structurally Unemployed Workers, Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 35 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Industrial Policy] (statement of Marvin Cetron, President
Forecasting Int'l, Ltd.) (Cetron does not criticize the PICs of the JTPA, but rather, focuses on the
problems in the operation of similar councils set up under the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act.).
231. See Industrial Policy, supra note 230, at 20 (statement of Marc Bendick Jr., Senior Research
Associate, Urban Institute); Industrial Policy, supra note 230, at 29-30 (statement of Marvin Cetron,
President, Forecasting Int'l, Ltd.).
232. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2292(b), 2293(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1983-1985).
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gan proposal assert that the availability of cash benefits beyond the expiration of
unemployment acts as a disincentive to job hunting.233 Other critics of TAA,
pointing to the increase in retraining dropouts at the end of the 26 week extended
benefit periods argue that most workers enter retraining only to obtain the extra
cash benefits available to trainees.234 It is equally plausible, however, that the
dropout rate demonstrates the pressure that a lack of income places on the
unemployed to spend their time and resources looking for a job rather than
training for one.
235
A third problem with providing adjustment assistance through the JTPA is that
the program's eligibility requirements guarantee that assistance will be delivered
too late to encourage the gradual, on-the-job adjustment that is least disruptive to
workers and has proven so successful in Japan. Theoretically, under TAA, bene-
fits are available on threat of import injury.236 The JTPA, in contrast, only pro-
vides post-job-loss assistance. Only workers who have been permanently laid off
or served notice of permanent layoff and are unlikely to return to their previous
occupation or have lost their jobs as a result of a permanent plant closure are
eligable for aid. 237 Financial aid is delivered too late to help underwrite labor-
management programs that would maintain employment. Assistance through the
JTPA is explicitly unavailable unless a decision to sever the employment rela-
tionship has been made or executed. Thus, the Administration's proposed use of
the JTPA will do little to encourage the recently emerging trend of collectively
bargained worker-management adjustment plans.
231
Similarly, the expansionists' plans to reduce market constraints on distribu-
tion239 would do little to encourage programs jointly designed by labor and
management to preserve existing employment relationships. Expansionist Harold
Williams argues that a national level tripartite planning committee charged with
creating an industry-wide plan would ensure this type of labor-management
involvement. 24 However, the failure of the nationally planned direct aid methods
of the Japanese Government, a bureaucracy that is known for its use of cooper-
ative decision making in industrial planning, 24' indicates that labor-management
233. 1985 O'Keefe Testimony, supra note 103, at 240.
234. Conversation with Glenn Zech, Director, Trade Adjustment Assistance Office, Department of
Labor (Mar. 22, 1985) (discussing the positions of various observers of TAA) (notes on file, Michigan
Yearbook of International Legal Studies).
235. Id.
236. 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (1982 & Supp. 11 1983-1985).
237. 29 U.S.C. § 1652(a) (1982).
238. See supra note 210.
239. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
241. Examples of such cooperative industrial planning are numerous. In addition to Sanrokon (the
Industry Round Table Labor Conference) and Korokon (the Round Table Conference for Public
Corporations and National Enterprise Labor Problems)-organizations composed of top ranking
leaders of labor, management, and government created to establish trust and cooperation in the
operation of both private and public enterprises-a significant number of government ministries have
set up tripartite councils to advise them on policy planning. Such councils exist in the Ministry of
Labor, the Prime Minister's Office, the Administrative Management Agency, Economic Planning
Agency, Environment Agency, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, Ministry of Transport, and the Ministry of Construction. In the
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planning on a national level to implement industry-wide change may well be
ineffective. The flexibility and innovation required for successful adjustment
demands guidance from management and workers at the plant or company level.
C. An Alternative Proposal for a Two-Pronged Adjustment Assistance
Program
An adjustment program that targets those suffering import injury inevitably
involves both formalistic distinctions between similarly situated workers and
post-job loss adjustment 24 -neither of which is conducive to the cooperative,
company-specific, on-the-job retraining that the Japanese experience suggests is
crucial to continuous worker adjustment. Still, retraining provisions in some
recent U.S. labor contracts243 do hold out some hope that this cooperative attitude
can be fostered in the United States. Some might even argue that the emergence
of these provisions through the market-defined collective bargaining process
supports the maintenance of existing market checks on the distribution pro-
cedures of TAA or even the adoption of the Administration's proposal to elimi-
nate compensation for trade-impacted workers and reduce federal involvement in
adjustment generally. However, if the United States is to continue to pursue free
international trade, some type of federal compensation must be provided to
workers in import-competitive firms. 244 Furthermore, the Japanese experience
suggests that during difficult economic periods, private retraining initiatives will
be dropped unless underwritten by the government.
Thus it seems that both the compensation and market adjustment principles of
the current program must be maintained. They would function more smoothly,
however, if they operated independently of one another. The remainder of this
note proposes a two pronged adjustment program that would maintain but sepa-
rate these two driving forces of TAA.
The first prong of this program is intended to satisfy the compensation princi-
ple. It would consist of a modified version of TAA incorporating the current
program's certification requirements and procedures, but limiting the distribution
Ministry of Labor, there are tripartite councils concerning labor standards, industrial homework,
workmen accident compensation insurance, minimum wages, workmen's property accumulation,
women and young worker's problems, employment security, physically handicapped person's em-
ployment, land vocational training. Draft bills and policy outlines are decided after being discussed
by these councils. See JAPAN INST. OF LABOR, LABOR UNIONS AND LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS 31-32 (Japan Inst. of Labor, Japan Industrial Relations Series No. 2, 1983).
242. Line drawing is an unavoidable dilemma of extending the compensation principle to workers
suffering the effects of increased imports since there are few industries, manufacturing or service, to
which some connection to imports can not be demonstrated. The problem of getting aid to workers
prior to dismissal, while maintaining the compensation principle, similarly seems to be intractable.
Predicting import injury whether to firms, indutries, or workers is difficult. As a result, the "threat"
clauses of trade laws, such as section 2251 of the TRADE AcT of 1974, are rarely used. The
International Trade Commission almost always investigates and determines whether an injury exists,
not whether the "threat" of injury exists. See e.g., Note, An Examination of lTC Determinations on
Imports: the Basis for Substantial Injury, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 242.
243. See supra note 210.
244. See supra note 206.
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of assistance to a lump sum cash payment. Although TAA's certification pro-
cedures exclude some workers who can trace their job loss to imports, they
appear to satisfy the desire of organized labor for some type of recognition of the
injury workers may suffer from international trade policies designed to benefit
consumers. They also provide workers and management at individual plants with
the opportunity to work out their own solutions to adjustment problems prior to
certification.
Under this first, compensatory prong, benefits would be limited to a lump sum
cash allowance paid in addition to unemployment insurance benefits. Employ-
ment services would not be available. This limitation on benefits would enable
the federal government to provide compensation without having to direct workers
to new jobs. The workers who received compensation could use their benefits to
support themselves during an extended period of job search or to obtain new
skills to make themselves more attractive to prospective employers.
While the program's compensatory prong would likely quiet union opposition
to the liberalization of trade, it would not encourage the formation of on-the-job,
worker-management designed adjustment programs. Furthermore, it would
maintain the current, arguably unfair, distinction between unemployed indi-
viduals. The second prong of the program, consisting of tax incentives for on-
the-job training, would minimize these problems while creating a relationship
among government, labor, and management like that fostered by the indirect aid
program in Japan.
The concept of the second prong is based on an obligation to retrain. Every
company would be required to spend a specified percentage of its total wage bill
on maintaining and expanding employee skills. If a company chose not to train
its own workers, it would be required to pay the percentage to the government
through a payroll tax. Similarly, if it chose not to spend the full percentage
required, the remainder would also be owed to the government. The amount of
time spent in training and the type of training made available would be subject to
collective bargaining.
This system should encourage management and labor to adopt up-to-date,
flexible production methods. The obligation to spend would provide management
with an incentive to update its production processes since the outlay of the payroll
percentage would be a fixed operating cost whether or not it was used to retrain
workers. The collective bargaining requirement should assuage the fear of job
loss that often motivates unions to maintain rigid work rules that hinder adapta-
tion to new production technologies. Guaranteed a voice in allocating money set
aside to keep worker skills on a par with plant improvements, unions are likely to
be more willing to subject work rules to frequent scrutiny.
Many companies may find that they do not need to spend the entire payroll
percentage in order to provide their workers with the skills demanded by new
equipment and production process. If these extra funds were used to provide
employees with new skills and education unrelated to company products, some
might object that the program was no more than a federally mandated employee
bonus. However, such expenditures might also be viewed as "privatized public
adjustment." With the idea that they were preparing workers for new jobs in
different companies or even in new industries, management and unions would
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bargain for education and training in a variety of areas unrelated to company
production. Thus, the program would be a privately driven means of moving
workers from dying to developing industries.
Although intriguing, the latter argument is likely to win few supporters. To rest
what is essentially a welfare responsibility (that is, a responsibility unrelated to
the production or market goals of a company) on the collective bargaining pro-
cess places too much faith in the belief that bureaucratic representatives of man-
agement and unions can effectively pursue values other than those related to
profit and wage maximization. A better alternative, and the one proposed by this
note, is a requirement that all private training funded by the payroll percentage be
related to the funding company's current or future output. Any unused portion
would be given to the federal government which, in turn, would distribute it to
JTPA programs or retraining schemes designed by national unions or community
based organizations. These funds might also be used to underwrite the benefit
payments of the proposal's import compensation prong.
The payroll percentage prong of the proposal would necesitate an enforcement
mechanism to prevent companies from creating sham training programs designed
to avoid both the tax and the expense of retraining. A worker evaluation and
complaint provision backed by civil or criminal penalties, while requiring an
investment of Labor Department and judicial resources, would likely minimize
the instances of employer-generated sham. Of course, sham training would pose
a greater threat if a local union colluded with its management to retain unused
funds. However, the influence and self-interest of union co-members who are
employed by different companies and who might, in the event of lay off, benefit
from government distribution of the unused payroll percentage, would probably
minimize this possibility.
2 45
245. The payroll percentage prong of the program described in this note draws on a French
program that was described to Congress in 1983. Industrial Policy, supra note 230, at 20-23
(statement of Marc Bendick Jr., Senior Research Associate, Urban Institute). Based on an "obligation
to spend," each French employer of more than 10 employees is required to spend 1. 1 percent of its
total bill on retraining. Id. at 20-21. Employers may conduct the training themselves, donate the
funds to one of several industry-wide training programs which are generally run by employers'
associations, or give the money to a government training center. Id. at 21. The proposal in this note
differs mainly in requiring that that collective bargaining be used to determine how funds will be used
and in mandating that all company-conducted training be related to the product or service sold by the
company.
California and Delaware have also enacted training programs similar to the one described here, but
with certain substantial differences. See O'Connell & Hoerr, There Really Are Jobs After Retraining,
Bus. WEEK, Jan. 28, at 76; Retraining: Calafornia's Novel Approach, WORLD OF WORK REPORT,
July 1984 at I Instead of requiring all companies to spend a designated amount on retraining,
California and Delaware cut unemployment insurance taxes and created a new tax on companies to
raise retraining funds. Those funds are distributed through a panel that includes representatives of
unions and business as well as state officials. The panel reimburses companies that hire and retrain
workers. To ensure that the tax funds are not misused, employers are reimbursed only after having
employed the newly trained employee for 90 days. Id. at 76. Businesses that have experienced few
layoffs, and thus received few benefits from the unemployment insurance taxes they pay, see this as
an opportunity to receive a return on their investment. Id. at 77.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The two-pronged approach to adjustment assistance described in this note
would address several of the concerns raised by the critics of TAA. First, like the
Japanese indirect aid measures, this proposal would minimize program depen-
dence on general federal revenues. The payroll percentage prong contains a
transfer mechanism that requires successful companies to underwrite the retrain-
ing of former employees of less successful companies.
Second, it would deemphasize the import injury distinction of TAA while
maintaining the compensatory function that that law originally was intended to
serve. Although distinctions are at the heart of any compensation program, they
can often appear unfair and thus cause unrest. This two-pronged proposal would
minimize the visibility and force of the import injury distinction by limiting
benefits to one lump sum payment per worker. Yet, in providing some type of
compensation for import injury it would acknowledge the sacrifices made by
particular U.S. workers to preserve the position of the United States in the
international market.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the proposal would encourage the
development of a Japanese-like adjustment attitude among unions and manage-
ment in the United States. The prevalence of this attitude-which favors continu-
ous, on-the-job worker retraining-would hopefully minimize the need for
national government planners to determine which new skills workers need and
how they should obtain them.
